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INTRODUCTION
The United States wears its sovereignty most uneasily at
home. Abroad, U.S. sovereignty justifies a number of wellsettled practices, including national self-determination,
border control, and sovereign immunity in foreign courts. But
domestic sovereignty can be tricky. In the United States, the
people are the sovereign. 1 Yet the U.S. government regularly
invokes sovereign privileges against its people. 2 One such
privilege is the right to avoid suit. Unless it deigns otherwise,
the federal government cannot be sued—even by citizens
seeking redress for government-inflicted harms—a privilege
belonging so clearly to the sovereign that it is labeled
“sovereign immunity.”
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has met considerable
public disfavor. One group of citizens recently harmed by the
doctrine erected a plaque to memorialize their discontent. In
the wake of the Hurricane Katrina litigation, a historical
marker was added to the site of the 17th Street Canal Breach,
reading in part: “In 2008, the US District Court, Eastern
District of Louisiana placed responsibility for this floodwall’s
collapse squarely on the US Army Corps of Engineers;
however, the agency is protected from financial liability in the
1. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1425, 1439 (1987) (“[T]he sovereignty of the people . . . informs every article of
the Federalist Constitution” and that it is “no happenstance that the Federalists
chose to introduce their work with words that ringingly proclaimed the primacy
of that new understanding: ‘We the people of the United States . . . do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America’ ” (quoting U.S.
CONST. pmbl.)); Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1201, 1214 (2001) (citing approvingly to Amar’s argument that “the first
words of the Constitution, ‘We the People,’ . . . makes the people sovereign”
(quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.)). Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United
States stated:
To the Constitution of the United States the term SOVEREIGN, is
totally unknown. There is but one place where it could have been used
with propriety. But, even in that place it would not, perhaps, have
comported with the delicacy of those, who ordained and established
that Constitution. They might have announced themselves
‘SOVEREIGN’ people of the United States: But serenely conscious of
the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 454 (1793) (Wilson, J.).
2. Acting as a sovereign, the national government exclusively determines
who is a citizen and who is not. See Chirac v. Chirac’s Lessee, 15 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 259, 269 (1817) (“That the power of naturalization is exclusively in
congress does not seem to be, and certainly ought not to be, controverted.”).
Moreover, it can conscript us via the draft. See 32 C.F.R. § 1615.1 (2014).
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Flood Control Act of 1928” (a statute reaffirming the defense
of sovereign immunity for certain flood-related claims). 3 This
public dissatisfaction echoes the widespread academic
critiques of the doctrine, which focus almost exclusively on
the dissonance between basic constitutional values—
democracy, justice, government redressability—and the
virtually impenetrable citadel of sovereign immunity. 4 As
Professor John Copeland Nagle relayed, “No scholar, so far as
can be ascertained, has had a good word for sovereign
immunity for many years 5 . . . . [N]early every commentator
who considers the subject vigorously asserts that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity must go.” 6
Despite the academic encouragement to abandon the
doctrine, the Supreme Court of the United States continues to
reaffirm federal sovereign immunity. 7 As Justice Stevens
wrote (apparently with some sadness), “the doctrine is
unquestionably alive and well today.” 8
3. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2013) (reaffirming the defense of sovereign immunity
for certain flood-related claims). The plaque was posted by Levees.org, an
organization created in response to the Hurricane Katrina levee failures. It was
unveiled on August 23, 2010. See Historic Plaque Program, LEEVES.ORG,
http://levees.org/historic-plaque-program (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
4. See, e.g., Steven Menashi, Article III as a Constitutional Compromise:
Modern Textualism and State Sovereign Immunity, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1135, 1138 (2009) (“[T]he American doctrine of sovereign immunity is
indefensible upon both theoretical and pragmatic grounds. . . .” (quoting CLYDE
JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 160 (1972)));
Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal Sovereign Immunity
Jurisprudence, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 525 (2008) (“From the founding of
our nation, the mantle of sovereign immunity has rested uneasily on a
government designed to be limited in powers and understood to draw its
authority from the people.” (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208–09
(1882))); Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1201 (“[S]overeign immunity is an
anachronistic concept, derived from long-discredited royal prerogatives, and . . .
it is inconsistent with basic principles of the American legal system.”).
5. John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear
Statement Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 771, 775 n.24 (1995) (quoting Roger C.
Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for of
Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68
MICH. L. REV. 389, 392 (1970)).
6. Id. (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §
25.01, at 435–36 (1958)).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 (2009); Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994); United States v. Mitchell, 445
U.S. 535 (1980); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
8. John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1121, 1126
(1993). Stevens argues that sovereign immunity is a “judge-made doctrine”
with “tentacles” that
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This Article argues what none have before—that while
the Court is right that federal sovereign immunity is not
inherently unconstitutional, it is wrong that sovereign
immunity is constitutional in its current form. The argument
is as follows: the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity is
constitutional inasmuch as it is a background principle upon
which the Constitution was drafted and insofar as it is
consonant with the Constitution. In articulating the doctrine,
the Court has erred by ascribing to Congress the exclusive
right to waive immunity. If Congress truly had this exclusive
waiver authority, it could decide to disallow any suit against
the government, including those for constitutional violations.
This is impermissible. The Constitution requires that the
Supreme Court serve as a check on the other two branches’
general compliance with constitutional values. 9 Accordingly,
it does not allow the Court to give Congress the power to
prevent the Court from hearing constitutional cases; to do so
would negate the Court’s ability to monitor the
constitutionality of Congress’s behavior. Therefore, Congress
cannot have exclusive control over sovereign immunity
waiver. This authority must be shared by Congress and the
Court.
This simple argument reveals that the waiver authority,
properly construed, is constitutionally entrusted to not one,
but at least two of the federal branches. That two branches
can share the waiver authority raises another possibility: the
waiver authority can be shared by all three branches.
This three-branch waiver configuration is based on the
principle that each federal branch—legislative, executive, and
judicial—can exercise only the powers and act only in the
roles assigned to it by the sovereign people via the
Constitution. Because of the derivative and limited nature of
deposit their seeds of injustice not only in the numerous recreational
facilities that are a by-product of our flood control legislation, in the
waters that are polluted by illegally-operated federal facilities, and in
the rising tide of bankruptcy proceedings in all parts of the country, but
also, no doubt, in numerous areas of litigation that have not yet
completely surfaced.
Id. at 1128. Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States found in favor of
the United States on sovereign immunity grounds as recently as 2012, when it
held in United States v. Bormes, that sovereign immunity prevented the kind of
suit the plaintiff had brought against the United States. Id. at 19–20
(discussing 133 S. Ct. 12 (2012).
9. See infra Part II.A.
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the federal government’s sovereignty, the federal government
is perhaps best viewed as holding proxy sovereignty. That
proxy authority is divided among the branches; no one branch
wields all of the proxy powers. As Congress and the Court
each exercise one portion of the sovereign powers held by the
federal government in proxy for the sovereign people, the
President too acts as a partial proxy sovereign. It follows,
then, that as Congress and the Court can waive immunity in
certain circumstances, the President also has a proxy
sovereign right to waive immunity.
The Court should adopt a three-dimensional form of
immunity that recognizes each branch’s limited proxy
sovereign right to waive immunity. Doing so will accord the
sovereign immunity doctrine with constitutional compliance.
And it may ameliorate the most criticized feature of sovereign
immunity—that it is a government defense virtually
impenetrable by the people.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I explores the
central feature of the current sovereign immunity waiver
doctrine—exclusive congressional waiver—traces the history
of the doctrine, discusses how it is used today, and presents
its scholarly defenses.
Part II argues that exclusive
congressional waiver is unconstitutional and explains that
the Court must reconfigure the immunity doctrine to allow
the Court to perform its necessary check on the political
branches’ general constitutional compliance.
Part II
concludes that immunity waiver power must be shared by at
least Congress and the Court. Part III advances the shared
waiver power idea to its next logical step—one that reflects
our
three-branch
government—by
advocating
an
interpretation of sovereignty and the Constitution that would
grant each branch its own (limited) power to waive immunity.
The Article concludes by discussing the advantages of an
immunity-waiver authority shared among the federal
branches.
I. ONE-DIMENSIONAL IMMUNITY: EXCLUSIVE CONGRESSIONAL
WAIVER
The current federal sovereign immunity doctrine centers
on Congress’s exclusive right of waiver.
Yet exclusive
congressional waiver is a feature of the current sovereign
immunity doctrine with dubious origins and few scholarly
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defenses. Inspecting the shaky legs upon which exclusive
congressional waiver wobbles is a first step to understanding
why the doctrine is not a necessary feature of sovereign
immunity—why, in fact, it is an unconstitutional one.
A. The Origins of Exclusive Congressional Waiver
Most origin stories of federal sovereign immunity are as
follows: federal sovereign immunity is a long-standing legal
principle, adopted by U.S. courts from early British
jurisprudence, and affirmed by Congress, beginning first with
its circa 1855 establishment of the United States Claims
Court, which provided a judicial forum for contract claims
against the government, and later with a host of statutory
waivers of federal immunity. 10 In this regime, only Congress,
and only via legislation, has authority to allow suit against
the federal government. Exclusive congressional waiver is
the linchpin of federal sovereign immunity waiver,
consistently reinforced by Supreme Court jurisprudence and
executive deference. As commonly understood, sovereign
immunity waiver is exclusively a congressional matter. 11
But a closer look at history reveals that the most
important actor in the story of federal sovereign immunity
waiver is neither the British crown 12 nor Congress—it is the
United States Supreme Court. The following discussion
differs from previous accounts of the origins of federal
10. See, e.g., ARTHUR MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3654 (3d ed. 1998) (“The doctrine of sovereign immunity can be traced to the
English concept that the king or queen, as the ultimate source of authority,
could do no wrong and should not be disturbed in the exercise of his or her
sovereign powers.”).
11. See, e.g., GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 800 (5th ed.
2009) (“[Y]ou cannot sue the United States, for any reason or any form of relief,
unless Congress has expressly consented by statute to be sued.”); GREGORY C.
SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 88 (4th ed. 2006) (“[T]he
doctrine of federal sovereign immunity stands as a bar to the lawsuit unless and
until Congress chooses to lift that bar and then only to the extent or degree that
Congress chooses to do so.”).
12. Others have described the ways in which our previous thoughts about
British sovereign immunity practice were based on misreadings of British legal
history. Many have persuasively argued that British sovereign immunity did
not prevent suit against the king. At least not in the ways traditionally thought.
See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition:
Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the
Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 923 (1997); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 210 (1963).
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sovereign immunity by detailing the Court’s role in the
development of federal sovereign immunity and emphasizing
the Court’s unilateral decision to vest the waiver authority
exclusively in Congress.
Very early in its jurisprudence, the Court was unsure
about how sovereign immunity would apply, if at all, to the
United States’ unique federal system. When the Court heard
Chisholm v. Georgia just a few years after Ratification, the
Court was asked to address the question of whether sovereign
immunity prevented the plaintiff, Mr. Chisholm, from suing
the state of Georgia. 13 The Court decided that, in the new
American nation, sovereign immunity was not a defense
behind which states could hide. 14 Dissatisfied with the
Court’s decision, the states quickly worked to adopt a
constitutional amendment that would codify the protection of
states from private suits. 15
What is often overlooked in Chisholm is the Court’s
earliest discussion of federal sovereign immunity. Although
the Chisholm decision turned entirely on state sovereign
immunity, two of the five justices mentioned the idea of
federal sovereign immunity in seriatim opinions and both
expressed disfavor with the doctrine as a matter of
constitutional interpretation.
Justice Cushing expressed
doubt that an interpretation rendering the federal
government suable was “necessary” as a matter of
constitutional interpretation:
[w]hen speaking of the United States, the Constitution
says ‘controversies to which the United States shall be a
party’ not controversies between the United States and
any of their citizens . . . [whereas] [w]hen speaking of
States, [the Constitution] says, ‘controversies between two
or more states; between a state and citizens of another
state.’ 16

Chief Justice Jay agreed with Cushing, further explaining
this interpretation of Article III: “[I]f the word party
comprehends both Plaintiff and Defendant, it follows, that the
13. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420, 469 (1793) (Jay, C.J.),
superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
14. See id. at 479.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
16. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 469 (Cushing, J.) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
cl. 1).
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United States may be sued by any citizen, between whom and
them there may be a controversy.” 17 Jay questioned whether
the Court had the authority to enforce judgments against the
other federal branches, but he expressed hope that suits
against the United States would lead to meaningful
government redress. 18 Despite their doubts about federal
sovereign immunity, both Cushing 19 and Jay 20 agreed it was
not necessary to decide the question in Chisholm. The other
justices did not comment on the federal analog to the state
sovereign immunity issue before them. Although the hasty
passage of the Eleventh Amendment reinstated state
sovereign immunity, 21 federal sovereign immunity was
unaffected by the amendment process.
The Court did not address the question of federal
sovereign immunity until almost two decades later, 22 but
early cases such as Marbury v. Madison seemed to establish
that citizens could seek redress against the government in
The
federal courts without congressional approval. 23
defendant in Marbury was James Madison in his role as
Secretary of State. The plaintiff, William Marbury, felt
himself injured by Madison’s official actions as a federal
executive officer. In resolving their dispute, the Court
reasoned through a federal sovereign immunity-type
question: “[i]f he [Marbury] has a right, and that right has
been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a
remedy?” 24 After noting that “[i]n Great Britain the king
himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he
never fails to comply with the judgment of his court,” 25 and
quoting repeatedly from Blackstone’s Commentaries about
the propriety of redress for all legal wrongs, the Court held
that Madison’s role as government actor did not prevent

17. Id. at 478 (Jay, C.J.).
18. Id. Chief Justice Jay opined: “I wish the State of society was so far
improved, and the science of Government advanced to such a degree of
perfection, as that the whole nation could in the peaceable course of law, be
compelled to do justice, and be sued by individual citizens.” Id.
19. See id. at 469 (Cushing, J.).
20. Id. at 478 (Jay, C.J.).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
22. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
23. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
24. Id. at 162.
25. Id. at 163.
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suit. 26 When read as a sovereign immunity case—rather than
merely a case about the constitutionality of judicial review—
the Court’s famous words take on additional meaning: “[t]he
government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will
certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws
furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”27
Despite an absence of congressional authorization, the Court
allowed the case against Marbury to proceed. 28
Almost twenty years later, and without any intervening
on-the-record discussion, the Court issued this statement:
“The universally received opinion is, [sic] that no suit can be
commenced or prosecuted against the United States . . .
[because] the Judiciary Act does not authorize such suits.” 29
Apparently, between 1803 and 1821, the Court had made up
its mind about federal sovereign immunity—in a way
contrary to Marbury. The Court’s opinion in Cohens v.
Virginia does not cite to any case (not even to the Justices’
discussions in Chisholm), statute, or constitutional provision
as a source for an American federal sovereign immunity. The
Court does not even discuss the doctrine’s origin. Rather, the
Court merely asserts it, virtually ex nihilo, as a sort of default
legal truism. It does the same for each of its subsequent
nineteenth-century iterations of the doctrine. 30
26. Id. at 166.
27. Marbury, 5 U.S. 137 at 163. The Court’s reasoning on this issue was
ultimately more nuanced than across-the-board government immunity waiver.
The Court indicated that some actions by federal officials would be
“examinable” but others would not, an issue determinable by examining
conferred rights of discretion. See id. at 166. If, by the Constitution or by
statute a government official is given discretion to perform acts, those acts are
not reviewable by the courts. See id. Moreover, the Court stated:
[W]here the heads of departments are the political or confidential
agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the president, or
rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional
or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their
acts are only politically examinable.
Id. The Court added, “[b]ut where a specific duty is assigned by law, and
individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally
clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to
the laws of his country for a remedy.” Id.
28. Id. at 167.
29. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 410 (1821).
30. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882) (“There is vested in
no officer or body the authority to consent that the state shall be sued except in
the law-making power, which may give such consent on the terms it may choose
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The 1821 Cohens decision marked a second turn in the
Court’s jurisprudence. In addition to assuming that federal
sovereign immunity exists as a protective doctrine, the Court
also identified Congress as the sole authorized branch of
government capable of waiving immunity. After noting that
“no suit can be commenced . . . against the United States,” the
Court pointed out that “the judiciary act [presumably, the
Judiciary Act of 1789] does not authorize such suits.” 31 The
Court did not discuss its assumption that Congress could
waive the immunity, nor does it cite to authority for that
principle.
Rather, it assumed that whatever federal
sovereign immunity would exist in a post-monarchical
America, Congress would control it.
Once the Court decided federal immunity existed and
that only Congress could waive it, the Court never wavered.
It repeatedly asserted the doctrine of federal sovereign
immunity throughout the nineteenth century, but those
assertions were never accompanied by any explanation of the
source of the doctrine or by supporting legal reasoning. 32
When the Court finally issued an opinion addressing the
origins of federal sovereign immunity and the arguments for
its place in American jurisprudence, it was 1882, and the
doctrine was, by then, well established as legal precedent. 33
In U.S. v. Lee, the Court nevertheless pointed out the poor fit
between federal sovereign immunity and the United States’
constitutional structure. 34 The Court further discussed—and
to impose.”); The Davis, 77 U.S. (1 Wall.) 15, 15 (1869) (“[The United States]
cannot be subjected to legal proceedings at law or in equity without their
consent, and that whoever institutes such proceedings must bring his case
within the authority of some act of Congress.”); The Siren, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 152,
154 (1868) (“[T]he United States . . . cannot be subjected to legal proceedings at
law or in equity without their consent; and whoever institutes such proceedings
must bring his case within the authority of some act of Congress.”); United
States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (1 How.) 286, 288 (1846) (“[T]he government is not
liable to be sued, except with its own consent, given by law”); United States v.
Clarke, 33 U.S. (1 Pet.) 436, 443 (1834) (“As the United States are not suable of
common right, the party who institutes such suit must bring his case within the
authority of some act of congress, or the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over
it.”); Cohens 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 410 (“The universally received opinion is, [sic]
that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States; that
the judiciary act does not authorize such suits.”).
31. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 410.
32. See cases cited supra note 30.
33. Lee, 106 U.S. 196.
34. Id. at 208 (“But little weight can be given to the decisions of the English
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rejected—a number of reasons for the doctrine, including the
absurdity 35 and denigration 36 of requiring a sovereign to
appear in its own court, and the potential for interference
with the actions of a “supreme executive power” by individual
citizens and the judicial branch. 37 The Court noted that “the
principle [of federal sovereign immunity] has never been
Despite this
discussed or the reasons for it given.” 38
disapprobation and doubt, the Court nevertheless affirmed
the doctrine on the grounds that it had “always been treated
as an established doctrine,” citing to an 1834 Supreme Court
opinion for authority. 39 The Court yielded to court precedent,
and an unreasoned principle maintained its position in
American jurisprudence.
Lee marks a brief detour in the history of federal
sovereign immunity jurisprudence.
The Court openly
questioned the rationale for the doctrine in a way that it
never had and never has since. But Lee is important, not
because it questioned the rationale for federal sovereign
immunity, but because, despite questioning the doctrine, the
Court nevertheless affirmed the doctrine. 40 Thus, even at its
most skeptical, the Court held the doctrine of federal
sovereign immunity to be so fundamental that, despite its
deep concerns, the doctrine sustained the viability of the
principle.
Throughout history, the court treatment of sovereign
immunity makes clear that the United States Supreme Court
is the real father of modern-day federal sovereign immunity
jurisprudence. 41 The Court articulated the notion of federal
sovereign immunity. It then enunciated its exclusive reliance
upon
Congress
for
waiver
(hereinafter
“exclusive
congressional waiver”), and reaffirmed this idea until the
courts on this branch of the subject [national sovereign immunity], for [a]
reason . . . found in the vast difference in the essential character of the two
governments as regards the source and the depositaries of power. . . . Under
our system the people, who are there called subjects, are the sovereign.”).
35. Id. at 206.
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting Briggs v. The Lights Boats, 93 Mass. (1 Allen) 157, 162–63
(1865)).
38. Id.
39. Lee, 106 U.S. at 207.
40. Id.
41. For Justice Stevens’s discussion of the Court’s role in the creation of the
federal sovereign immunity doctrine, see Stevens, supra note 8, at 1123–24.
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other branches of government and the people adopted it too.
Today, federal sovereign immunity is a well-entrenched
Although criticisms of its constitutionality
doctrine. 42
43
a central feature of the doctrine—exclusive
abound,
congressional waiver—has received no criticism. Few scholars
have addressed it, and those who have expressed only partial
defenses of its application. 44 These defenses cannot explain
the application of exclusive congressional waiver to the entire
current sovereign immunity landscape.
B. The Current Landscape
Although Congress waited “[t]hree quarters of a century
. . . after the ratification of the Constitution before . . .
[enacting] the first significant grant” of sovereign immunity
waiver, 45 after it did, it began to demonstrate an increased
interest in legislating waiver laws. 46 Rather than waiving
sovereign immunity once and for all—a total withdrawal of
sovereign
immunity’s
“blanket
exemption
for
the
42. Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB L.
REV. 1, 6 (2002) (“Time and tradition have, of course, embedded the mistake of
sovereign immunity in our legal culture.”).
43. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 5, at 775 n.24 (noting that “[n]o scholar, so
far as can be ascertained, has had a good word for sovereign immunity for many
years”) (quoting Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal
Administrative Action: The Need for of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter
Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 389, 392 (1970)); id.
(stating that “nearly every commentator who considers the subject vigorously
asserts that the doctrine of sovereign immunity must go”) (quoting KENNETH
CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.01, at 435–36 (1958));
Menashi, supra note 4 at 1138 (“[T]he American doctrine of sovereign immunity
is indefensible upon both theoretical and pragmatic grounds. . . .”) (quoting
CLYDE JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 160
(1972)); Sisk, supra note 4, at 525 (“From the founding of our nation, the mantle
of sovereign immunity has rested uneasily on a government designed to be
limited in powers and understood to draw its authority from the people.”);
Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1201 (“Sovereign immunity is an anachronistic
concept, derived from long-discredited royal prerogatives, and . . . it is
inconsistent with basic principles of the American legal system.”).
44. See infra Part I.C.
45. Sisk, supra note 4, at 530. The first waiver of sovereign immunity
created limited liability for the federal government in a newly created Court of
Claims. Id. at 530–31.
46. See, e.g., Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245
(1940); Gregory C. Sisk, The Inevitability of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 55
VILL. L. REV. 899, 922–23 (2010); Sisk, supra note 4, at 517–18; Floyd D.
Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution
from A Legislative Toward A Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625,
690–91 (1985).
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government” 47—Congress has enacted various statutes
waiving sovereign immunity for particular kinds of suits. The
resulting sovereign immunity regime has been praised as a
“broad tapestry of authorized judicial actions against the
federal government” 48 and criticized as “a jerry-built
structure, a patchwork, a doctrinal stew.” 49
The heterogeneous nature of the current state of
congressional waiver is illustrated by three of Congress’s
most important statutory waiver creations: (1) the U.S. Court
of Claims 50 and the Tucker Act 51; (2) the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) 52; and (3) the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 53 Congress created the U.S. Court of Claims in 1855
to permit the court to investigate and advise contract claims
brought against the federal government. 54 But in 1863,
Congress amended this organic act to give the court binding
authority to resolve claims brought before it. 55 In 1887, the
Tucker Act expanded the Court of Claims’s jurisdiction to
hear constitutional and other non-tort claims for money
damages in the U.S. Court of Claims. 56 Until the midtwentieth century, the Tucker Act and the Court of Claims
comprised the primary avenue for judicial redress against the
federal government.
In the late 1940s, Congress passed two additional
statutes—the FTCA and the APA—which soon became
bulwarks of government immunity waiver. 57 The FTCA grew
47. Sisk, supra note 4, at 538.
48. Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign
Immunity and Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
602–03 (2003).
49. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 51 (1983).
50. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612, 612 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)) (stating the Court of Claims “shall hear and
determine all claims founded upon any law of Congress, . . . any regulation of an
executive department, or . . . any contract, express or implied, with the
government of the United States”).
51. Tucker Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505, 505 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. § 1491).
52. Federal Tort Claim Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 982, 983–85 (1948) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)).
53. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 551).
54. See 10 Stat. 612.
55. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765, 768 (amending 10 Stat. 612).
56. See 24 Stat. 505.
57. Sisk, supra note 48, at 603.
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out of a growing congressional sentiment that “the
Government should assume the obligation to pay for damages
for the misfeasance of employees in carrying out its work.” 58
When an army plane crashed into the Empire State Building
on July 28, 1945, engulfing two floors in flames, killing ten,
and injuring others, Congress quickly acted to pass legislation
that would allow suit against the government for these
damages. 59 The FTCA waived immunity for most tort suits
brought against the federal government under state law, and
it was backdated to allow for claims accrued in 1945
(including the Empire State Building crash). 60
Like the FTCA, the APA was enacted in 1946, but unlike
the FTCA, it was codified without a clear sovereign immunity
waiver. As originally enacted, the APA provided for suit
against the government to “any person suffering legal wrong
because of any agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant
statute,” 61 but without any explicit waiver of sovereign
immunity. Thus, courts were left to decide for themselves if
Congress had intended to waive immunity for claims brought
for equitable relief against the government. They did so
inconsistently and with confusion. 62 Accordingly, Congress
enacted an amended version of 5 U.S.C. § 702, this time
including an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity:

58. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953).
59. See Sisk, supra note 4, at 535–36.
60. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. § 2671).
61. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codified
as amended at 5 USC § 702).
62. See, e.g., Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273, 282 (7th Cir. 1974) (stating
that while the APA, alone may not represent a waiver of sovereign immunity,
the passage of certain statutes qualify consent by the sovereign to be sued);
Knox Hill Tenants Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(holding that district court erred in negating its own jurisdiction by reason of
sovereign immunity); Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1212 (4th Cir. 1971)
(holding that APA does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity); Penn v.
Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 1974), rev’d en banc, 497 F.2d 970 (5th
Cir. 1974) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not constitute a waiver because it
“contains no explicit waiver of sovereign immunity by the federal government.”)
(emphasis added); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Callaway, 398 F. Supp. 176, 191
(N.D. Ala. 1975) (stating that waiver applies in suits where “the plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief alone.”). See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1656, at 6 (1976) (discussing
these cases and the difficulty courts had discerning the applicability of
sovereign immunity to actions for equitable relief against the government).
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An action in a court of the United States seeking relief
other than money damages and stating a claim that an
agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to
act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority
shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the
ground that it is against the United States or that the
United States is an indispensable party. 63

This provision supplies the waiver necessary for actions
brought under the APA. The Supreme Court has further held
that the section 702 waiver of sovereign immunity applies to
all actions for equitable relief against the federal government,
including constitutional claims. 64
Together, the Tucker Act, the FTCA, and the APA
comprise three of Congress’s most important waivers of
sovereign immunity. Although under these three statutes
individuals can bring suits against the government for money
damages arising from contract or tort or for equitable relief,
limitations and exceptions cabin each waiver. 65 Additionally,
Congress has enacted more than ten other major legislative
waivers, each with its own exceptions and limitations. 66
Whatever the merits of these waivers, it is clear that
Congress has believed the Court when it said Congress could
act to waive immunity. And waive it has.

63. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721, 2721 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 702).
64. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
65. E.g., Tucker Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505, 505 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1500) (stating that the “United States Court of Federal
Claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to which the
plaintiff or his assignee has pending in any other court any suit or process
against the United States or any person who, at the time when the cause of
action alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or
professing to act, directly or indirectly under the authority of the United
States”). The FTCA does not allow suits against the United States for “[a]ny
claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, . . . libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.” 28
U.S.C. § 2680 (2000). The APA only allows suits for which there is “no other
adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
66. These include, among others, the Privacy Act, Title VII, Title IX, the
Freedom of Information Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age
Discrimination Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Ethics in
Government Act, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act. See Floyd D.
Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution
from A Legislative Toward A Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625
(1985).

BRINTON FINAL

252

5/23/201412:39 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

A review of administrative agency materials reveals that
executive practice reinforces this notion of exclusive
congressional waiver. Administrative documents make clear
that executive agencies have refrained from acting when they
believe doing so would expand waiver without congressional
approval. For example, in a response to comments on a
proposed regulation regarding the subpoena powers of the
Provider Reimbursement Review Board (the Board), an
administrative court for the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) asserted that it could not authorize
the Board to subpoena documents from government agencies
because Congress had not expressly waived immunity to that
effect. 67 CMS explained:
[W]e believe there is no statutory basis for the Board to
subpoena HHS and other Federal agencies. The United
States and its agencies, as sovereign, are immune from
suit, except to the extent to which they consent to be sued.
. . . There is no indication in the language of sections
205(d) and 205(e) of the Act, or in the legislative history of
those sections, that the Congress intended to effect a
waiver of sovereign immunity. . . . Because only the
Congress, and not Federal agencies, has the authority to
waive sovereign immunity, (see United States v. N.Y.
Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 660 (1947)), we would
be unable to subject HHS and other agencies to the
Board’s subpoena authority even if we were otherwise so
inclined. 68

To make absolutely clear that it would not act in a way
that would appear to waive immunity without congressional
authorization, CMS then opted to add clarifying language to
the proposed regulation “in order to prevent any implication
that the Board may issue a subpoena to CMS or to the
Secretary.” 69
Other administrative documents reveal similar and
widespread executive deference to congressional waiver.
Federal agencies regularly assert congressional failure to
waive immunity as a reason not to promulgate certain
regulations or take actions, including those requested or
67. Medicare Program; Provider Reimbursement Determinations and
Appeals, 73 Fed. Reg. 30190, 30223 (May 23, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
pts. 405, 413, 417).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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suggested by the public. For instance, agencies have asserted
Congress’s failure to waive immunity as a reason they could
not participate in “court-annexed” arbitration proceedings 70;
settle claims outside of court 71; pay damages for failure to
comply with legal process 72; approve state programs that
would require vehicles operated on federal installations to
adhere to state vehicle regulations 73; pay interest for back pay
awarded in employment discrimination cases 74 or other
judgments against the government 75; and approve state
regulations that would impose particular environmental
compliance burdens on military munitions sites. 76 These
refusals are unaccompanied by other supporting rationales;
rather, the agencies rely solely on Congress’s immunity
decisions to justify their own inaction. 77
70. Policy Statements; Local Court Rules Requiring Mandatory Arbitration,
50 Fed. Reg. 40524, 40524 (Oct. 4, 1985) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 50).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Processing Garnishment Orders for Child Support and Alimony
and Commercial Garnishment of Federal Employees’ Pay, 62 Fed. Reg. 31763
(June 11, 1997) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 581, 582); Garnishment of Postal
Employee Salaries, 59 Fed. Reg. 45625 (Sept. 2, 1994) (to be codified at 39
C.F.R. pt. 491); Garnishment of Postal Employee Salaries, 63 Fed. Reg. 67403,
(Dec. 7, 1998) (to be codified at 39 C.F.R. pt. 491).
73. See, e.g., Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Nevada;
Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 55466 (Sept. 25,
2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52); Approval of Implementation Plans and
Designation of Areas for Air Quality Planning Purposes; Nevada, 73 Fed. Reg.
1175 (Jan. 7, 2008) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pt. 52, pt. 81); 74 Fed. Reg. 3975
(Jan. 22, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (same result); Privacy and
Disclosure of Official Records and Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 20935, 20937 (Apr.
27, 2007) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 401); Approval of Implementation Plans
and Designation of Areas for Air Quality Planning Purposes; Nevada, 73 Fed.
Reg. 38124 (Jul. 3, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52, pt. 81); Approval of
Air Quality Implementation Plans; Delaware; Enhanced Motor Vehicle
Inspection and Maintenance, 64 Fed. Reg. 52657 (Sept. 30, 1999) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52); Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; State
of Missouri, 68 Fed. Reg. 25414 (May 12, 2003) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
74. See, e.g., Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity, 57 Fed. Reg.
12634 (Apr. 10, 1992) (to be codified 29 C.F.R. pt. 1614); Administrative Practice
and Procedure, 54 Fed. Reg. 24131, 24135 (Jun. 6, 1989) (to be codified 4 C.F.R.
pts. 27, 28).
75. Obtaining Payments From the Judgment Fund and Under Private
Relief Bills, 71 Fed. Reg. 60848 (Oct. 17, 2006) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt.
256).
76. Military Munitions Rule: Hazardous Waste Identification and
Management; Explosives Emergencies; Redefinition of On-Site, 60 Fed. Reg.
56468 (Nov. 8, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 260–265, 270).
77. See, e.g., Medicare Program; Provider Reimbursement Determinations
and Appeals, 73 Fed. Reg. 30190, 30223 (May 23, 2008) (to be codified at 42

BRINTON FINAL

254

5/23/201412:39 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

And, as discussed above, the Supreme Court still insists
that Congress has the exclusive waiver authority. 78 Exclusive
congressional waiver is the basis for the judicial doctrine that
without an express statutory waiver of federal sovereign
immunity, suits against the government must be dismissed.
Exclusive congressional waiver also undergirds the Court’s
sovereign immunity interpretive canon, which directs courts
to interpret strictly any statutory waiver of immunity in favor
of the Government. 79 This interpretive canon is based on the
judicial concern that Congress, not the courts, has authority
In preserving the canon, the Court has
for waiver. 80
preserved reliance on exclusive congressional waiver.
C. The Scholarly Defense
Like the federal branches, legal academics, too, take for
granted that the waiver authority resides with Congress. 81
Some state it quite strongly: “[Y]ou cannot sue the United
States, for any reason or any form of relief, unless Congress
C.F.R. pts. 405, 413, 417) (“Because only the Congress, and not Federal
agencies, has the authority to waive sovereign immunity, . . . we would be
unable to subject HHS and other agencies to the Board’s subpoena authority
even if we were otherwise so inclined.” citing United States v. N.Y. Rayon
Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 660 (1947))).
78. See supra Part I.A.
79. See, e.g., Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012)
(“We have said on many occasions that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be
‘unequivocally expressed’ in statutory text.” (quoting Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S.
187, 192 (1996))); FDIC. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 474 (1994) (parsing statutory
text to determine if sovereign immunity is waived); United States v. Nordic
Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 39 (1992) (“Since Congress has not empowered a
bankruptcy court to order a recovery of money from the United States, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.”); Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990) (noting that Congress must create sovereign
immunity waivers, which the Court then interprets); United States v. Mitchell,
445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (“In the absence of clear congressional consent [to suit],
then, ‘there is no jurisdiction in the Court of Claims more than in any other
court to entertain suits against the United States.’ ” (quoting United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587–88 (1941))).
80. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969).
81. See, e.g., SISK, supra note 11, at 341 n.5 (“Such consent can be had only
by formal legislative action.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government:
Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L. L.
REV. 521, 570 (2003) (“What we call the ‘sovereign immunity’ of the United
States in many respects could be described as a particularized elaboration of
Congress’ control over the lower court’s jurisdiction.”); ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., &
WILLIAM T. MAYON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 539 (2d ed. 2001) (“Sovereign
immunity may be waived, but only by legislative act.”); Jaffe, supra note 12, at 2
(“If there was any successor to the King qua sovereign it was the legislature.”).
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has expressly consented by statute to be sued.” 82 Or “the
doctrine of federal sovereign immunity stands as a bar to the
lawsuit unless and until Congress chooses to lift that bar and
then only to the extent or degree that Congress chooses to do
so.” 83 In fact, no scholars have questioned the validity of
exclusive congressional waiver.
A few scholars have attempted to present a merited
defense of the doctrine, however. The preeminent piece on
exclusive congressional waiver is Harold Krent’s landmark
Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 84 which explores the
justifications for Congress’s primary role in the sovereign
immunity waiver. Krent’s piece couches its argument as a
defense of sovereign immunity, but it is at heart a defense of
exclusive congressional waiver. He ably argues that because
Congress is politically accountable both to the public and to
the President (through the veto power), it is uniquely
qualified to “determine when to rely on the political process to
Krent worries that a
safeguard majoritarian policy.” 85
legislative branch powerless to decide when to waive
immunity will be bound inextricably to the policy preferences
of judges, or will be afraid to act for fear of committing
judicially cognizable torts. 86 Further, that a Congress unable
to decide the immunity question might also be bound by the
“dead hand of Congresses past,” whose decisions regarding
contracts and other government obligations might “prevent[]
contemporary Congresses from pursuing current concerns as
effectively.” 87 Krent notes that the Executive also benefits
from Congress’s waiver authority: “[s]overeign immunity,
therefore, allows Congress to immunize the executive branch
from any judicial review when the costs of such review are too
great.” 88
But Krent notes that these justifications for exclusive
congressional waiver are more persuasive in the tort 89 and

82. LAWSON, supra note 11, at 800.
83. SISK, supra note 11.
84. Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 1529 (1992).
85. Id. at 1532.
86. Id. at 1530–31.
87. Id. at 1530.
88. Id. at 1536.
89. Id. at 1541.
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contract 90 law. His arguments in favor of congressional
waiver are developed exclusively in these common law areas.
He intentionally omits from his defense of congressional
waiver the issue of constitutional violations. 91 As Krent
writes, “Indeed, there is presumably less justification for
judicial review of policymaking in the tort and contract
contexts than in the constitutional setting.” 92 Thus, Krent’s
arguments in support of exclusive congressional waiver rivet
to only a portion of current sovereign immunity practice.
Just as Krent cabins his arguments to areas in which
exclusive congressional waiver makes most sense, Professors
Paul Figley and Jay Tidmarsh also offer a limited defense of
Although Figley and
exclusive congressional waiver. 93
Tidmarsh couch their argument broadly—they claim to have
located a constitutional source for sovereign immunity in the
Appropriations Clause of the Constitution—their detailed
historical justification of exclusive congressional waiver
focuses solely on immunity against damages. 94 Tracing the
history of the appropriations power in England, they argue
that the Article I Section 9 Clause 7 granted legislative
control over money as a mirror of parliamentary control over
the purse. 95 Figley and Tidmarsh state their case strongly:
“the history of the Appropriations Clause reflects, from the
outset, that its meaning was never disputed as a matter of
principle and its import was clear. Absent Congressional
assent, the Clause precluded suits against the federal
government for damages.” 96 They do not attempt to present a
constitutional
source—or
historical
justification—for
Congress’s control of the waiver authority in cases against the
government for equitable relief. 97
90. Id. at 1560.
91. Id. at 1535 (“There is no need here to replay the ongoing debate over a
theory supporting judicial review of constitutional questions. Suffice it to say
that the justification for judicial review is at its nadir when judges supplant the
policymaking of the majority.”).
92. Id.
93. See Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and
Sovereign Immunity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1207 (2009).
94. See id. at 1209.
95. See id. at 1258.
96. Id. at 1264.
97. Figley and Tidmarsh refer to “suits brought against the United States
for damages” as “the central category” of “eight distinct categories of immunity.”
Id. at 1209. These categories are:
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Unfortunately, these scholars’ thoughtful defenses of
exclusive congressional waiver in cases involving torts,
contract, and damages do not account for the breadth of the
sovereign immunity doctrine described in Part I.A above.
Recall that each branch of the government accords to
Congress the exclusive right to waive immunity—even in
cases that are not tort, contract, or damages. For instance, in
the APA, Congress has waived immunity for cases expressly
not involving money damages. 98 The executive has declined
to subpoena documents from the government, citing a lack of
congressional waiver for injunctions of that kind. 99 And the
Court has refused to find an exception to a statute of
limitations, solely on the basis that doing otherwise would
override congressional judgment about what equity
requires 100—equity, a quintessential element of judicial
prerogative. Legal academia has yet to provide a coherent
justification for these expressions of exclusive congressional
waiver.
Nor can it.
As this Article will argue, the
Constitution does not afford Congress a true exclusive waiver
power.
II. TWO-DIMENSIONAL IMMUNITY: WAIVER BY CONGRESS,
WAIVER BY COURT
The argument that Congress must share the waiver
authority is a simple one. The Constitution requires that the
(1) sovereign immunity for the United States against suits seeking
damages; (2) sovereign immunity for the United States against
suits seeking injunctive relief; (3) sovereign immunity for federal
officials against suits seeking damages; (4) sovereign immunity for
federal officials against suits seeking injunctive relief; (5) sovereign
immunity for a state against suits seeking damages; (6) sovereign
immunity for a state against suits seeking injunctive relief; (7)
sovereign immunity for state officials against suits seeking
damages; and (8) sovereign immunity for state officials against
suits seeking injunctive relief. In categories 3, 4, 7, and 8, a further
division can be made between official-capacity suits and individualcapacity suits.
Id. at 1209 n.7. This Article assumes that a coherent account of the federal
sovereign immunity doctrine must address both categories 1 and 2, at least. Id.
at 1209.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
99. See Medicare Program; Provider Reimbursement Determinations and
Appeals, 73 Fed. Reg. 30190, 30223 (May 23, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
pts. 405, 413, 417).
100. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990).
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Supreme Court serve as a check against the other branches’
unconstitutional behavior. 101 Therefore, the Supreme Court
cannot defer to Congress the exclusive ability to waive
immunity. The Court must, at a minimum, retain the right
to waive immunity in cases in which plaintiff(s) claim the
government has acted unconstitutionally. Accordingly, the
waiver power is one that must be shared by at least Congress
and the Court.
A. The Court and the Constitution
The Court’s power to review the constitutionality of other
branch actions, even without congressional approval, is
rooted in the Constitution. The debate surrounding this
proposition is too extensive to repeat here. Suffice it to say, it
is as old as Marbury v. Madison, in which the Court asserted
its authority to review the constitutionality of legislation.102
The Court has likewise claimed a right to review executive
action, perhaps most famously in Youngstown Sheet and Tube
Co. 103
Of course, court assertions of power are themselves
invalid unless they stem from actual constitutional grants.
Professors Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer have defended
court review of constitutional questions on the basis of
constitutional structure: “Constitutional remedies serve . . . to
reinforce structural values, including those underlying the
separation of powers and the rule of law.” 104 Because the
framers feared the possibility of arbitrary and tyrannical
political branches, Fallon and Meltzer argue, they created the
judiciary “to represent the people’s continuing interest in the
protection of long-term values.” 105 According to Fallon and
Meltzer, the Court serves as this check, not by remedying
every individual violation, but by “ensur[ing] that government
generally respects constitutional values.” 106
101. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, NonRetroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1787–88
(1991) (“The Constitution thus contemplates a judicial ‘check’ on the political
branches not merely to redress particular violations, but to ensure that
government generally respects constitutional values . . . .”).
102. 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch), 162 (1803).
103. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
104. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 101, at 1787.
105. Id. at 1788.
106. Id.
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The Court’s role as final constitutional arbiter derives
from its place in the constitutional system.
Its
determinations of constitutionality are unreviewable by any
other branch and are, in fact, only remediable by the hugely
cumbersome amendment process. 107 The Court has a peculiar
responsibility to monitor governmental action accountability,
and it has the power to do so. 108 The Constitution expressly
authorizes the Court to hear “controversies to which the
United States shall be a party.” 109 While this clause is open
to interpretation, it is certainly arguable that within the
Court’s irreducible minimum of constitutional jurisdiction is
the ability to hear claims against the federal government. 110
This is particularly true where constitutional questions are at
issue, given the Court’s “judicial power” to hear “all cases, in
law and equity, arising under this Constitution.” 111
As the final constitutional arbiter, the Court must be able
to hear claims against the government, even if Congress does
not want judicial review. Allowing Congress to remove from
the Court the power to hear constitutional questions,
including those against the federal government, would
remove from the Court the power to fulfill its constitutional
responsibility to support “this Constitution” as the “supreme
That is something neither the
law of the land.” 112
Constitution nor the Court may allow Congress to do.
The Court’s ability to hear constitutional claims in the
absence of congressional approval is fairly well established.
The Court’s creation of Bivens actions is an example of the
Court’s use of this constitutional gatekeeping power. 113 After
107. U.S. CONST. art. V.
108. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1 Dall.), 478 (1793) (Jay, C.J.).
111. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. cl. 1.
112. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
113. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Court held that a private citizen had a right to
sue federal agents for damages when those agents had allegedly acted
unconstitutionally, even though Congress had not authorized such a suit or
remedy. Id. at 397. As the Court wrote,
it is well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done.
The present case involves no special factors counseling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.
Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
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Bivens, an individual could file a claim for money damages
against an individual officer, though only if there are not
what the Court calls “special factors counseling hesitation in
the absence of affirmative action by Congress,” and only if
“Congress has [not] provided an alternative remedy which it
explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly
under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective.” 114
Bivens counsels that courts hesitate to hear these
constitutional money damages claims if Congress has acted,
but Bivens actions themselves are authorized directly by the
Court—not by Congress. 115
Although Bivens actions are alleged against individual
officers and not against the government itself—and therefore
not a pure example of court-created sovereign immunity
waiver—they exemplify the Court’s constitutionally conferred
authority to independently authorize suits (1) despite the
absence of congressional authorization if (2) constitutional
challenges are raised. 116 The Court has resisted congressional
attempts to divest the judiciary of jurisdiction to hear
constitutional questions.
For instance, in Califano v.
Sanders, the Court found that it was uniquely qualified to
hear constitutional questions, despite statutory review
schemes that seemed to “effectively have closed the federal
forum to the adjudication of colorable constitutional
claims.” 117 The Court rejected a reading of the statute that
would remove constitutional questions from its review
because “access to the courts is essential to the decision of
such questions.” 118 In other words, even if Congress wanted
the Court to turn a blind eye to the constitutionality of a
question, the Court would not. Constitutional review is its
prerogative, and Congress (or, for that matter, the executive)
lacks authority to amend or withdraw a delegation made by
the people themselves.
Similarly, in Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce
Corp., the Court expressly retained its authority to hear

114. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Bivens Actions—United States
Supreme Court Cases, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 159, § 2 (2007).
115. Id.
116. See Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 at 389.
117. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977).
118. Id.
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constitutional claims against the government. 119 As the Court
wrote, “[u]nder our constitutional system, certain rights are
protected against governmental action and, if such rights are
infringed by the actions of officers of the Government, it is
proper that the courts have the power to grant relief against
those actions.” 120
Professor Walter Dellinger makes the point clearly:
“[T]he failure of Congress to authorize suits against the
Treasury may no more bar a judicially created remedy than
the failure of Congress to create a cause of action against the
officer barred the development of that particular remedy in
Bivens.” 121 He explains that an often-cited justification for
sovereign immunity—”there can be no legal right against the
authority that makes the law upon which the right
Dellinger writes, “[I]n a
depends”—is inapposite. 122
constitutional case, the right involved does not ‘depend’ upon
the government, but rather arises from the basic law which
created and seeks to control that government.” 123
Notably, the Court’s authority on constitutional text is
greater than its authority on statutory or regulatory text. If
Congress passes a law to mean X, and the Court interprets it
to mean Y, then all that need happen to restore the law to its
X meaning is for Congress to enact a new law (or an
amendment) clarifying the law’s meaning as X. This new law
may of course be subject to judicial review, but this scheme—
as constitutionally envisioned—differs markedly from that
involving constitutional texts. The same is true for cases
involving regulations, although the subsequent clarification
can either be adopted by Congress via statutory override or it
can be promulgated by an Executive agency via the
regulatory process.
For cases involving either statutory or regulatory
questions, the Court’s interpretation can be overcome by
subsequent branch action, without resort to popular
involvement and the amendment process. The Constitution,
then, creates a different relationship between the judiciary
119. 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).
120. Id.
121. Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution As a
Sword, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1557 (1972).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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and the Constitution than it does between the judiciary and
statutes or regulations, regardless of the practical similarities
among the tasks of interpreting each kind of text.
Thus, it becomes apparent—from constitutional
structure, constitutional text, the Court’s own jurisprudence,
and scholarship—that Courts have the authority to hear
constitutional claims against the government, even without
congressional approval. In fact, as discussed above, the Court
itself articulates this right. But somehow, when it articulates
the sovereign immunity doctrine, it ignores this reality and
instead credits Congress with exclusive waiver power.
B. Sharing the Power
The time has come for the Court to remedy its sovereign
immunity rhetoric and, to some extent, its practice. While
the Court may still look to Congress for the waiver authority
in cases involving alleged statutory violations by or common
law suits against the government, the Court should no longer
spin the fiction that Congress is vested with the sole waiver
authority. Rather, the Court should acknowledge its own
inalienable power to waive immunity in cases in which
plaintiffs have sued the federal government for constitutional
violations. Importantly, the Court need not use its waiver
authority in every case involving an alleged constitutional
violation by the government. As Fallon and Meltzer argue, to
serve as a meaningful constitutional check, the Court need
only enforce general constitutional compliance, so the
branches are on notice and are prepared for the possibility of
judicial review: “[T]o keep the government generally within
constitution bounds . . . does not depend on the provision of
any single remedy, retroactive or prospective, but instead on
the system of constitutional remedies as a whole.” 124 While
selective waiver by the Court might prevent it from
remedying every constitutional violation by the federal
government, 125 selective waiver would allow the Court to
weigh the factors that currently inform congressional waiver
decisions—balancing the costs to the public of allowing
litigation to proceed (e.g., court costs, attorneys’ fees, docket
124. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 101, at 1795.
125. This would underserve the first of the “two basic functions” of
constitutional remedies, as described by Fallon and Meltzer: “to redress
individual violations.” Id. at 1777.
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load, the costs—either financial or effort—of any courtimposed remedies) with the costs to the plaintiff of preventing
remedy to alleged injury. To that end, because the Court
could make its waiver determinations on a case-by-case basis
more effectively than Congress can, it might better be able to
determine which cases are effective vehicles for monitoring
government behavior and which are unnecessary or
inadvisable to hear.
One might ask: But can the Court just up and change its
sovereign immunity jurisprudence willy-nilly? Especially
after almost two hundred years with this established legal
doctrine? Although reasonable sounding, these questions
misunderstand both the nature of the Court’s relationship to
the sovereign immunity doctrine and what changes a two-way
sharing of the sovereign immunity would entail.
While it is true the Court had a primary role in the
development of the sovereign immunity doctrine (as discussed
in Part I), it is an overstatement to say that the Court created
the doctrine. It is better to say the Court enunciated the
doctrine. Because broad federal sovereign immunity is not an
artifact of the Constitution, it is best justified as a
background principle upon which the Constitution was
formed.
Constitutional background principles are by
definition not explicit in the text of the Constitution; rather,
they are unwritten tenets that, we assume, the Founders
meant to inform our reading of the Constitution.
Importantly, we rely upon the Supreme Court to articulate
Although the
constitutional background principles. 126
historical documents and logic the Court relies upon to suss
out these principles are available to everyone, the Court is
the one to enunciate—and fix—an authoritative account of
the Founders’ shared assumptions. When the Court must
interpret the Constitution for a case before it, the Court may
find that, although not codified, a pre-constitutional principle
remains in force. In these cases, we may disagree with the
126. See, e.g., McCreary County, Kentucky v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (articulating the principle of religious neutrality
as underlying the First Amendment based, in part, on intentions of “[t]he
Framers and the citizens of their time”); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539 (1976) (finding that the Framers did not intend for either the First or Sixth
Amendments to be assigned priority over the other, despite the foreseeable
tensions between freedom of the press and right to an impartial jury, and
resolving the case upon that background principle).
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Court’s articulation of that principle, but we would be foolish
to ignore the Court’s reliance upon the principle.
Federal sovereign immunity is one such background
principle. The Court has never located a constitutional
provision for the doctrine. Instead, when it reaffirms the
doctrine (as it has done repeatedly 127), it cites only to its own
precedent, which chains back to United States v. Lee and its
reliance upon the early Court’s (misguided) adoption of a
doctrine “derived from the laws and practices of our English
ancestors.” 128 This reliance upon pre-constitutional history
without a corresponding constitutional cite is strong evidence
that the Court considers federal sovereign immunity an
unwritten principle upon which the Founders agreed.
But the Supreme Court’s role as background principle
articulator does not allow the Court free rein to create any
background principles it chooses.
Rather, any Courtenunciated doctrine must comport with the Constitution,
even if it comprises an underlay to the Constitution itself. An
interpretive canon asserts that where a text contradicts the
background on which that text was drafted, the express
Accordingly, only
language of the text supersedes. 129
textually consonant aspects of the underlay remain. Applying
this canon to constitutional interpretation, it strains credulity
to believe that the Constitution’s express terms would not
take precedence over pre-constitutional implied terms. To
accept anything else would be to wrest the Constitution from
127. See, e.g., United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 (2009); FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980);
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (citing United States v.
Thompson, 98 U.S. 486; United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196; Kan. v. United
States, 204 U.S. 331; Minn. v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 387; Keifer & Keifer
v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388; United States v. Shaw 309 U.S.
495).
128. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882). For an example of
the Court’s citation chain back to Lee, see, e.g., United States v. Dep’t of Energy
v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992) (“[A]ny waiver of the National Government’s
sovereign immunity must be unequivocal, see United States v. Mitchell.”);
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (“It is elementary that ‘[t]he
United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued
. . . . United States v. Sherwood.’ ” ); United States v. Sherwood, 312, U.S. 584,
586 (1941) (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196) (“The United States, as
sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . .”).
129. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976); cf. Hassan
v. Colorado, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1198–99 (D. Colo. 2012), aff'd, 495 F. App’x
947 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2769, 186 L. Ed. 2d 218 (U.S. 2013).
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its most obvious meanings.
If this is true—that pre-constitutional background
principles must necessarily be constitutionally consonant—
then the Court’s current iteration of the federal sovereign
immunity doctrine is unconstitutional, regardless of what the
Court has said in the past. The current doctrine purports to
vest in Congress exclusive waiver authority. That is, the
Supreme Court has said that the Founders intended that
Congress alone could decide whether the federal
government’s actions could be subject to judicial review at the
hand of the populace in all cases, at all times, no matter what
the alleged injury or purported crime. No matter if the
alleged grievance is a constitutional one. This version of the
doctrine is unconstitutional because it violates the checks and
balances embedded in the Constitution.
The Court not only can, but it must revise its articulation
of federal sovereign immunity if the doctrine’s current form
does not comply with the Constitution. The nature of
discerning background principles is such that the Court may
easily revise its previous understanding, with little more than
a discussion of the evidence for its error and the correction.
In articulating this provision of the doctrine of federal
sovereign immunity waiver—that the Court retains waiver
authority over cases involving claims of constitutional
violations (what this Article calls “Court constitutional
waiver”)—the Court would not be creating a new doctrine;
rather, it would be ameliorating the doctrine, finally and at
long last bringing it into constitutional compliance.
III. THREE-DIMENSIONAL IMMUNITY: WAIVER FOR ALL
BRANCHES
Recognizing that the sovereign immunity waiver power is
necessarily shared by two of the federal branches—the
legislative and the judiciary—raises the question: Why not
the executive? A previously unconsidered but strong case
exists for a waiver power that is shared by each branch of the
federal government. In such a regime, each branch would
hold a part of the waiver authority, subject to the roles and
limitations imposed upon that branch by the Constitution’s
separation of powers. This Part develops this triply-shared
power and argues that it is this conception of sovereign
immunity that is the most constitutionally consonant of all.
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A. A Proxy-Sovereign Government
The argument that each branch of government shares in
the federal immunity waiver authority begins with a
recognition that, in the United States, it is the people—and
not the government—who are sovereign.
If one takes
seriously the Federalist view that the Constitution
contemplates sovereignty residing in the people, 130 then the
federal government to which the Constitution gives form is
merely a proxy—a holder and exerciser of derivative
authority, subject to the constraints placed upon it by the
Viewed in this way, the
authorizing sovereign. 131
Constitution is a contract, designed to codify the terms on
which the proxy sovereign will act in the place of the
sovereign. 132
130. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 454 (1793) (Wilson, J.)
To the Constitution of the United States the term SOVEREIGN, is
totally unknown. There is but one place where it could have been used
with propriety. But, even in that place it would not, perhaps, have
comported with the delicacy of those, who ordained and established
that Constitution. They might have announced themselves
‘SOVEREIGN’ people of the United States: But serenely conscious of
the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration.
Id.; 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 128 (1800) (remarks of Sen. Pinckney) (“I suppose
it will hardly yet be denied, that the people are the common fountain of
authority to both the Federal and State Governments. . . .”); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at,1214 (citing approvingly to Amar’s argument
that “the first words of the Constitution, ‘We the People,’ . . . make the people
sovereign”); Amar, supra note 1, at 1439 (arguing that the sovereignty of the
people “informs every article of the Federalist Constitution” and that it is “no
happenstance that the Federalists chose to introduce their work with words
that ringingly proclaimed the primacy of that new understanding: ‘We the
people of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America’ ” ); id. at 1451–53 (“Nationalists and states’ rightists
could offer complementary—indeed, virtually identical—accounts of how the
sovereignty of the People enabled the Constitution to empower yet limit federal
officers, to impose restrictions on state governments, and to separate and divide
power within the federal government. On such questions, it did not much
matter which People were sovereign, but only that ‘the People’ were and that
governments were not.”).
131. A. Benjamin Spencer has explained the Framers’ approach to this proxy
sovereign “assignment” of powers: “The Framers first had to agree on what
powers the national government as a whole would have and then they had to
decide to which department to assign such powers.” A. Benjamin Spencer, The
Judicial Power and the Inferior Federal Courts: Exploring the Constitutional
Vesting Thesis, 46 GA. L. REV. 1, 35 (2011). He further argued that because
“[a]chieving this balance was a tricky matter,” and because of “what rested on
these decisions,”“one is obligated to honor the decisions made and take seriously
the allocations of power on which the Framers settled.” Id.
132. The proxy-sovereign framework advocates an approach similar in
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The sovereignty arrangement formed by the Constitution
is complicated. First, the Constitution assumes that the
people will exercise their sovereignty through two levels of
government—federal and state—which itself raises difficult
questions of federalism, state rights, and the nature of dual
As Justice Kennedy has written: “The
sovereignty. 133
Framers split the atom of sovereignty. . . . Constitution
created a legal system unprecedented in form and design,
establishing two orders of government, each with its own
direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are
governed by it.” 134 In addition to cutting the sovereign powers
between state and federal governments, the Constitution
divides the sovereign proxy powers at the federal level. For
purposes of federal sovereign immunity, only the second cut
matters: the assignment of the sovereign’s national powers to
three branches, each branch exercising primary responsibility
for one of three national sovereign authorities.
As discussed more fully below, Articles I, II, and III
identify powers and limitations on each federal branch, which
those branches are without power (and authorization) to
unilaterally—or collectively—change. 135 The only way for the
general, if not in detail, to Martin H. Redish and Elizabeth J. Cisar’s “pragmatic
formalism.” See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to
Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41
DUKE L.J. 449, 454 (1991). As Redish and Cisar describe it, to determine the
“constitutional validity of a particular branch action, from the perspective of
separation of powers,” a court should resort “solely [to] the use of a definitional
analysis” by “determining whether the challenged branch action falls within the
definition of that branch’s constitutionally derived powers-executive, legislative,
or judicial.” Id. Like Redish and Cisar’s “pragmatic formalism,” the proxysovereign framework points to the constitutional account of separation of
powers as a basis for determining what federal actions are constitutionally
consonant. See also Odette Lienau, Who is the “Sovereign” in Sovereign Debt?:
Reinterpreting a Rule-of-Law Framework from the Early Twentieth Century, 33
YALE J. INT’L L. 63, 76–77 (2008) (“Jean-Jacques Rousseau is perhaps the
paradigmatic early political theorist in this vein, arguing that legitimate
government must be grounded in a ‘social contract’ in which the force of the
government or prince is merely the public force concentrated in him. As soon as
he wants to derive from himself some absolute and independent act, the bond
that links everything together begins to come loose.”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
133. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity As A Doctrine of Personal
Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1581–82 (2002).
134. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
135. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 3 (requiring that all federal officials—

BRINTON FINAL

268

5/23/201412:39 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

formal reordering or revision of this tripartite system of
government is through the constitutional amendment
process, which requires the approval of the sovereign people
(either acting directly or through their state-elected
representatives). 136 Thus, the Constitution makes clear that,
despite the potency of the powers delegated to the federal
branches, those powers are limited, and they must be
exercised on behalf and with the approval of the people. As
the Court wrote in Loving v. United States, “By allocating
specific powers and responsibilities to a branch fitted to the
task, the Framers created a National Government that is
both effective and accountable.” 137
This understanding of the proxy relationship between the
federal government and the people comprises what this
Article calls “the proxy-sovereign framework”—that is, a
framework by which the constitutionally prescribed
relationships and roles of the sovereign people and its proxy
sovereigns (the federal branches) can resolve questions about
the limits and contours of federal branch behavior. The
proxy-sovereign framework allows a closer inspection of the
so-called sovereign conduct of the federal government than
current scholarship affords. Rather than allowing the United
States to act domestically as a sovereign without limits, the
proxy-sovereign framework requires that each expression of
sovereign privilege by a branch of the federal government be
supported by the specific terms upon which that branch was
charged with exercising the people’s sovereignty.
As applied to sovereign immunity, the proxy-sovereign
framework reveals that the Constitution requires a triplyshared waiver authority.
It does so through a logical
syllogism: If waiving sovereign immunity is the prerogative of
the sovereign, then that prerogative runs with sovereignty.
In a system with proxy partial sovereigns, some part of
sovereign waiver prerogative runs with the proxy sovereign
powers allocated to each branch, unless the waiver power has
been exclusively consigned to one branch. Because the
Constitution does not allocate the waiver power to one
particular branch, each branch retains its portion of the
legislative, executive, and judicial—must be “bound by Oath or Affirmation, to
support this Constitution”).
136. U.S. CONST. art. V.
137. 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996).
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waiver power that is consonant with that branch’s proxy
sovereignty.
Congress retains the waiver power as
expressible by a legislature, cabined and shaped by Article I;
the President retains the waiver power as expressible by
Article II’s terms on the executive; and the judiciary retains
the waiver power as expressible by Article III courts. This
argument and its implications will be briefly discussed below.
B. Congress and the Waiver Power
Understanding how Congress can properly exercise its
federal sovereign immunity waiver power first requires an
understanding of Congress’s constitutional role as a proxy
sovereign. What the sovereign people tasked Congress with
doing—and what they prohibited Congress from doing—
defines what situations and via what processes Congress is
authorized to waive sovereign immunity on behalf of the
sovereign. Ultimately, this discussion should support a
central claim of this Article: while the Constitution allows
Congress broad authority to waive sovereign immunity via
legislation, as Congress has done, the sovereign people have
not vested exclusive waiver authority in Congress. While this
claim does not disturb current congressional waiver practice,
it should fundamentally alter our rhetoric about federal
immunity waiver and give permission for the other federal
branches to exercise their proxy waiver powers.
1. Congress’s Constitutional Role
Although the debate about the proper role of Congress
began well before Congress did, 138 the Constitution reveals,
and most contemporary scholars agree, that Congress’s
constitutional role constitutes at least the following: (1) it is a
policy-making body with (2) majoritarian representation and
(3) enumerated (specific but arguably limited) powers. 139
138. See, e.g., Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, in 5 ELLIOTT’S
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 139, 286, 317 (2d. ed. 1986).
139. See, e.g., Krent, supra note 84, at 1533 (discussing the applicability of
Congress’ role as a policy-making body with majoritarian representation to
federal sovereign immunity); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1153, 1176 (1992) (discussing Congress’s constitutional power and noting that
Congress’ “legislative powers are limited to the specifically enumerated powers
‘herein granted’ by the Constitution”).
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Each of these facets of congressional identity has implications
for Congress’s ability to waive sovereign immunity;
accordingly, it is valuable to review them at least briefly.
The Constitution ordained Congress to be a policymaking body. By virtue of Article I, Congress is the branch
tasked with originating and authorizing national laws.
Congress’s policy choices are not subject to much secondguessing by the other branches. 140 With the exception of the
presidential veto—which itself can be overcome by
congressional
override—and
judicial
review
for
unconstitutionality, a law Congress passes will remain law
until a subsequent congressional majority changes policy
direction and votes otherwise. The Constitution vests in
Congress the responsibility for making mostly unreviewable
choices to effect the ends they choose by the means they
choose.
Whether the term “legislative powers” itself
comprises the discretionary nature of this rulemaking
authority is an issue hotly contested by scholars, 141 but that
debate needn’t be resolved for purposes of this article. Here it
is sufficient to argue that, at least as to the enumerated
powers in Article I, Section 8, Congress alone retains the
authority to make policy choices as a first actor. 142 This
140. This is true insofar as constitutional text is concerned. In practice, the
President can issue signing statements that indicate his disapproval of the
legislation he is signing; he can direct executive agencies to refrain from
implementing the laws created by Congress; and he can use his bully pulpit to
speak out against congressional policy. Courts can, of course, find statutes
unconstitutional. But, as discussed above, as a matter of constitutional text,
when Congress makes policy decisions, the other branches are limited in their
abilities to legally undo congressional policymaking.
141. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the
Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1297, 1308 (2003); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2115 (2004);
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1331, 1332–33 (2003); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1728 (2002).
142. Ascribing an exact denotation to the “legislative power” that is unique to
Congress as among the federal branches and consonant with the text of the
Constitution is difficult. As others have noted, even “historical evidence shows
that ‘legislative power’ was not a term of art that was used in a single way.”
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 141, at 1342. The central tenet of my effort
here is that when Congress makes choices within constitutional limits, which
choices become law that bind the nation, the only critique other branches or the
populace can levy against Congress is that it used its discretion poorly, not that
it used it unlawfully.
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means that Congress can weigh public sentiment, costs and
benefits, constitutional or other values, or even caprice and
whim, to initiate domestic rules in certain areas, without
much concern for the toes of other branches. 143
Congress’s responsibility to make national policy is
coupled with its constitutional responsibility—or burden—of
being responsive to the national polity. 144 The primary
mechanism for this responsiveness is the manner of
representative selection and removal, identified in Article I,
Sections 2 through 5 (and, in 1913, the Seventeenth
Amendment). This feature of congressional representation
has been discussed in detail elsewhere, 145 but the effects of
this fairly direct responsiveness to the people cannot be
overstated. Because the Constitution tasked Congress with
effecting the will of the people and subjected individual
representatives to regular constituent reelections, it seems
fair to say that the Framers established Congress as the most
finely calibrated barometer of popular will of the three federal
branches.
Charged with the task of national policymaking and
chosen by local popular elections, Congress can only exercise
certain powers. The nature of congressional power—its force
as well as its scope—is defined by Article I, most importantly
Section 8. Two points about Congress’s Article I powers are
necessary here. First, most scholars interpret Article I,
Section 8 as giving Congress the “power of the fisc,” by which
they mean plenary control over the federal government’s
money. 146 Congress’s bundle of financial powers is identified
143. See U.S CONST. art. I, § 8.
144. See, e.g., David Schoenbrod, Politics and the Principle That Elected
Legislators Should Make the Laws, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 240 (2003)
(“This Constitution required legislators to take responsibility not only for tax
laws, but all other laws regulating the people, as well as all laws appropriating
their money.”).
145. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1293
(2012); Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259, 1260
(2012); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 29 (1985).
146. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715,
725 (2012); Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 93, at 1252 (“First, the Convention
never had in mind that the right of appropriation could be exercised by any
branch other than the legislature.”); Todd David Peterson, Protecting the
Appropriations Power: Why Congress Should Care About Settlements at the
Department of Justice, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 327, 329 (2009) (in particular, see
string cites at footnote 17); Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE
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in Section 8; it includes the power to tax, borrow money, pay
debts, coin money, and prosecute counterfeiting. 147 If the very
structure of the Constitution and its scheme of separation of
powers does not make clear that the power of the purse is
exclusively congressional, Section 9 itself imposes this
limitation: “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but
in consequence of appropriations made by law.” 148 Although
some dispute the reality of this sole control, 149 there is strong
support that the Framers intended Congress to have plenary
control over the federal government’s expenditures. 150
A second point about Congress’s enumerated authority:
nothing in Article I, which details all congressional authority,
expressly gives Congress the authority to waive sovereign
If Article I included a clause like the
immunity. 151
following—“The power to allow suit in law or equity against
the United States and its officials”—this article would be very
different. But it does not. Nor do any of the enumerated
powers clearly comprise a waiver authority.
The
repercussions of this will be discussed further below, but the
point is necessary to make here as part of our discussion of
Congress’s constitutional role. This lack of express authority
matters. Article I’s first words—”[a]ll legislative powers
herein granted”—coupled with the Tenth Amendment
prohibit grafting onto Congress legislative powers not given it
by Article I. If the Framers intentionally vested Congress
with sole control over federal immunity waiver, then the
waiver authority must be found within a provision of Article
I. Because it is not, then either Congress does not possess the
authority, or Congress shares it with other organelles under
some other theory.
2. Congress’s Waiver Power
At least these features of Congress’s constitutional role—
its role as policymaker, its responsiveness to popular will, and
its limited but meaningful bundle of powers—have important
L.J. 1343, 1344 (1988).
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
148. U.S. CONST. art. I, at § 9, cl. 7; see Stith, supra note 146, at 1349–1350.
149. HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 77–83 (2005).
150. See, e.g., Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 93, at 1263.
151. Cf. id. at 1252 (arguing that the appropriations power implies exclusive
congressional authority over waivers of federal sovereign immunity in cases for
damages against the United States).
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implications for our understanding of immunity waiver. Let’s
remember: when understood in context of the proxy-sovereign
framework, Congress is the federal organelle charged with
exercising one part of the people’s sovereign powers: in
particular, a subset of the people’s sovereign legislative
powers. 152 Therefore, if the authority to waive sovereign
immunity is a feature of sovereignty, then insofar as Congress
is expressing the people’s sovereignty, it can exercise a
concomitant power of sovereign immunity waiver.
With this backdrop, the three features of Congress’s
constitutional role discussed above largely support current
congressional waiver practice. As noted earlier, Congress has
exercised its authority to allow waiver of immunity in a
variety of contexts. In each case, it did so after engaging in
policy discussions informed by its political responsiveness.
The FTCA is a notable example. Public outcry about the
military plane crash into the Empire State Building prompted
Congress to finally retract the federal government’s immunity
to tort suit, which it had been debating for more than twenty
years. 153 The public outcry even prompted Congress to
retroactively date the law, to allow some claims (including the
plane crash) that had already occurred. Subsequent revisions
to the FTCA were enacted after further political discussion,
including a sharp response to a 1988 Supreme Court opinion
interpreting the law to allow more individual official liability
than Congress felt was appropriate. 154 These legislative acts
were an entirely appropriate expression of Congress’s waiver
authority. As a matter of sovereignty, the people charged
Congress with using its derivative legislative authority to
enact legislation responsive to the public will. And, within
constitutional constraints (via legislation, by duly elected
representatives, not in violation of any substantive
constitutional limitations), Congress did so. 155
152. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. X (providing that the remainder of the
peoples’ sovereign legislative powers is “reserved to the states respectively, or to
the people.”).
153. See DANIEL A. MORRIS, FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 1:10 (2012).
154. See id., § 7:4; Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988).
155. In neither the FTCA nor the legislative documents issued
contemporaneously with the first version does Congress articulate with which
enumerated power it was enacting the law. This is no surprise—Congress
routinely does not root its acts expressly in provisions of the Constitution—but I
would argue that within most interpretations of the enumerated powers, the
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The caveat: nothing about Congress’s constitutional
role—or its enumerated powers—restricts the waiver
authority to Congress. Although a waiver of immunity can
take the form of legislation, it need not (as will be discussed
later). And nothing in Article I expressly allocates to
Congress the authority to waive immunity. Even Krent’s
article justifying congressional waiver of federal immunity in
cases of tort and contract 156 does not exclude the possibility
that the waiver authority might be held simultaneously—
although differently—by Congress and the other two
branches. Certainly his analysis does not foreclose the
possibility, as he justifies congressional waiver on grounds of
institutional competency and policy rather than on
constitutional text. 157 Even better, his article invites the
possibility: first, by noting the role that courts play in
protecting constitutional boundaries and rights 158; second, by
noting that the executive, like Congress, exercises “some of
th[e] responsibility” to “formulate . . . national policy” 159; and
third, by noting that Congress monitors Congress, “[j]udges
judge judges,” and “the executive branch enforces the law
with respect to its own officers.” 160
C. The Judiciary and the Waiver Power
Like Congress, the judiciary’s sovereign role affects how
it can express its portion of proxy-sovereign power. But
unlike Congress, the judiciary’s role is not so clearly
enumerated, at least not in the Constitution. 161 Rather, the
Court’s role has unfolded over time, as the Court and the
FTCA is appropriate, as part of its powers to pay debts, provide for the general
welfare, to make rules for the government, or to make laws that are necessary
and proper. In any case, it was an uncontroversial expression of congressional
authority.
156. See generally Krent, supra note 84.
157. Id. at 1533.
158. Id. at 1535.
159. Id. at 1537.
160. Id. at 1538.
161. “The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Craig A. Stern, What’s a
Constitution Among Friends?—Unbalancing Article III, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1043,
1043 (1998) (“Nine out of ten experts agree that a straightforward reading of the
first section of the third article of the United States Constitution does not
work.”).
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other branches have operationalized the strictures imposed
by the Constitution. 162 The Court now wields a few powers
that are widely accepted in practice and, for the most part, in
scholarship. This role justifies some ways in which the Court
currently waives governmental immunity, and it explains
what the Court does not—why those waivers are proper
demonstrations of the Court’s constitutionally allocated
proxy-sovereign power.
1. The Judiciary’s Constitutional Role
Academics have identified a host of court powers that
might be part of the Court’s irreducible minimum of “judicial
power.” Teasing through these proposals is beyond the scope
of this article. 163 One power of the Court is its role as final
constitutional arbiter, which is discussed in detail above. 164
The argument that the Court’s constitutional role gives rise to
and shapes its sovereign immunity waiver authority is also
made above, so it will not be repeated here.
A second relevant power set is also within the Court’s
arsenal—the Court’s equitable powers to manage the cases
before it. As part of its proxy-sovereign power to decide
“cases” and “controversies,” 165 the Court actively uses its
equitable powers—in particular, those that allow courts to
manage the cases brought before them—in accordance with
traditions of fairness or equity. These equitable powers are
relevant to the Court’s role as a sovereign immunity waiverer
because, as will be discussed later, they justify the Court’s
use of its waiver power when doing so would serve the Court’s
162. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a “Unified
Judiciary”, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1513, 1518 (2000) (“Of course, to say that the
Vesting Clause devolves upon Article III courts a ‘nebulous grant[ ] of power’ is
somewhat of an understatement; one must certainly go beyond that sparse
phrase to discover the power’s specific attributes.”) (quoting Calabresi &
Rhodes, supra note 139, at 1195.).
163. See, e.g., Alex Glashausser, The Extension Clause and the Supreme
Court’s Jurisdictional Independence, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1225 (2012); Spencer,
supra note 131; Tara L. Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal
Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2011); Stern, supra note 161; Calabresi &
Rhodes, supra note 139; Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article
III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Akhil R. Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the
Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1989);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988);
164. See supra Part II.A.
165. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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duty to manage cases equitably.
To understand the way this waiver might work, it is first
necessary to understand the justification for the Court’s
having equitable case management powers. In Hecht Co. v.
Bowles 166, the Court explained its use of broad equitable
powers, notwithstanding a statute that appeared to require
the Court to impose a specific remedy. 167
The Court’s defense in Hecht of its equitable powers is
more than an articulation of its (and the lower courts’)
continued reliance upon those powers; it is an exposition of
the justification for that reliance and of the powers’ defining
nature. In Hecht, the Court relied upon “several hundred
years of history” to justify and regulate “equity practice,” 168
suggesting that the Court does not consider the Constitution
to have swept clean its equitable authority. Rather, the
Court insisted it retained powers that were definitionally
broad: “The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power
. . . to do equity and to mould [sic] each decree to the
necessities of the particular case.” 169 In these ways, Hecht
supports a strong equity practice in American constitutional
jurisprudence.
The Court’s decision in Hecht suggests however, a
possible limitation on those equitable powers. The Court did
not assert that Congress is unable to modify the judiciary’s
use of equity practice. Rather, it found that, in that case,
Congress did not sufficiently articulate its intent to alter the
equitable scheme. This fact-specific holding left open the
possibility that, with enough chutzpah and clarity, Congress
could successfully amend or affect the Court’s reliance on
equity. Though only implied in Hecht, this possibility for
amendment has found expression in subsequent Court
cases. 170 It is now clear that when Congress wants to alter
the Court’s use of equity powers, it can do so. But it must do
so clearly and unequivocally, lest an intransigent Court find
reason to resist.

166. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
167. Id. at 329–30 (citation omitted).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 540 (1996) (finding that
a statutory codification of “principles of equitable subordination” allowed a court
to make exceptions but not to generally reorder legislatively chosen priorities).
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Congress’s efforts to revoke or cabin the judiciary’s equity
practice have targeted some equity powers more than others.
Equitable causes of action and remedies are often preempted
by or explicitly incorporated into federal statutory schemes 171;
federal courts’ efforts to assert these powers without
statutory authorization are met with controversy and some
disfavor by reviewing courts. 172 But another set of equitable
powers—what I call “case management powers,” such as
equitable tolling, waiver of affirmative defenses, waiver of
claims, etc.—are fairly standard, are generally accepted, and,
in some cases, are codified in court rules. 173 Like all equitable
powers, these case management powers are affectable by
Congress, 174 but I would argue that they are the ones least
likely to be so, at least under past and current practice. It is
not entirely apparent why the case management powers
should be met with more favor than other equitable powers.
Perhaps it is due to a commonly shared sense that strong
fairness values underlie the use of these tools, or to
Congress’s relative inattention to legislatively modifying or
prohibiting them. Whatever the reason, these equitable
powers are, at present, the safest for the Court to exercise
and are at the zenith of the Court’s equitable powers. 175
171. I would argue that when an equitable power is codified legislatively,
there is a strong argument that it loses its equitable nature and becomes
statutory, even if Congress has expressly incorporated the traditions underlying
the use of that equitable power.
172. See, e.g., Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,
527 U.S. 308, 332–33 (1999) (holding that the courts do not possess the
equitable authority to “create remedies previously unknown to equity
jurisprudence” and commenting that “debate concerning this formidable
[remedy] . . . should be conducted and resolved where such issues belong in our
democracy: in the Congress”).
173. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002) (“It is hornbook
law that limitations periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); FED. R. CIV. P. 13 (2011)
(requiring parties to plead affirmative defenses in response to a pleading).
174. See, e.g., Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)
(“We therefore hold that the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling
applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against
the United States. Congress, of course, may provide otherwise if it wishes to do
so.”).
175. For instance, in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Congress had
enacted a statute of limitations, which the Court construed to be a limitation on
Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity.
Notwithstanding this
acknowledgment that Congress had specified timing requirements, that those
timing requirements were jurisdictional (as part of the waiver of sovereign
immunity), and that interpreting those timing requirements would require the
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Traditionally, the Court has used its powers to equitably
manage cases to provide for some kinds of judicial fair play.
If a party has been unable to file its case within the
appropriate statute of limitations—because, for instance, a
timely-filed pleading was actually defective or because “the
complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s
misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass” 176—
federal courts have sometimes found justice to be served by
tolling the statute of limitations, allowing suit to proceed
after the statutorily prescribed deadline. 177 If the defendant
has failed to raise claims or affirmative defenses in a timely
manner, though those claims and defenses be valid, federal
courts routinely find that those claims and defenses are
waived, even if they would have merited redress or prohibited
suit, respectively. 178 Courts have reasoned that withholding
consideration of late but otherwise valid claims or that
keeping a defendant in a case, despite late but otherwise
dispositive defenses, is fair, in that doing so incentivizes
parties to act in ways that economize costs and provide fair
play for all parties and the courts. 179 In these ways, federal
courts routinely use their equitable powers to serve their
constitutional responsibility to act as proxy for the people’s
Court to interpret them narrowly in accordance with the Court’s sovereign
immunity interpretive canon, the Court found that its equitable powers
triggered tolling. The Court justified its ruling this way: “[W]e think that
making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government,
in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts to little, if any,
broadening of the congressional waiver. . . . Congress, of course, may provide
otherwise if it wishes to do so.” Id. at 95–96. Compare this easygoing tone to
the strict tone adopted by the Court in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v.
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., in which the Court was addressing the equitable
power to craft a novel judicial remedy: “Even when sitting as a court in equity,
we have no authority to craft a ‘nuclear weapon’ of the law like the one
advocated here [a kind of preliminary injunction]. . . . The debate concerning
this formidable power over debtors should be conducted and resolved where
such issues belong in our democracy: in the Congress.” 527 U.S. 308, 332–33
(1999).
176. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96.
177. See, e.g., id.
178. See, e.g., Boddy v. Dean, 821 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 1987); Martinez v.
Orr, 738 F.2d 1107 (10th Cir. 1984); Milam v. United States Postal Service, 674
F.2d 860 (11th Cir. 1982); Saltz v. Lehman, 672 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
179. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982)
(“By holding compliance with the filing period to be . . . a requirement subject to
waiver as well as tolling when equity so requires, we honor the remedial
purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the particular purpose of
the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer.”).
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sovereign power to finally resolve disputes, a unique role
facilitated by the court’s unique powers.
2. The Judiciary’s Waiver Power
The Court’s constitutional roles as final constitutional
arbiter and equitable case manager define how it may
appropriately use its sovereign immunity waiver power. One
application of this waiver authority has implicitly been
recognized by the Court, but more are available.
The primary way in which the Court has embraced its
waiver authority relates to its use of equitable powers to
allow apparently statutorily-barred suits against the
government to nevertheless proceed. For instance, in the
past, the Court has found its inherent equitable powers allow
it to toll statutes of limitations that otherwise have precluded
suit. As the Court stated in Irwin v. Department of Veterans
Affairs: “Once Congress has made such a waiver [of
immunity], we think that making the rule of equitable tolling
applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way
that it is applicable to private suits, amounts to little, if any,
broadening of the congressional waiver.” 180 The Court’s
“little, if any, broadening of . . . waiver” language is perhaps
an equivocal way of indicating that, regardless of practical
effect, the Court deemed itself justified in applying its
equitable tolling practices to sovereign immunity waivers.
And per the proxy-sovereign framework, it is. If applying
traditional principles of tolling allows the Court to manage its
cases in a way that serves equity, consonant with its
constitutional role of adjudicating cases and controversies,
then it has the proxy-sovereign authority to do so. This
analysis lends credence to the Court’s practice of making
available some federal accountability in situations that have
previously defied a coherent legal justification. But this
discussion also raises questions about what the Court could
be doing that it is not. For, in its efforts to sustain the legal
fiction of exclusive congressional waiver, it has left
unharnessed powers it could well exercise.
As noted above, the first thing the Court could (and
should) do differently in a proxy-sovereign-framework era is
to accurately describe the doctrines it has equivocally created.
180. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95–96.
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But the Court has open to it more than a change in rhetoric.
At least one concrete changes must follow: the Court could
consider sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense, as is
done at the state level, rather than as a jurisdictional bar, as
is the current federal practice. The current practice of
treating sovereign immunity waiver as a component of
jurisdiction defies both sense and statutory construction. In
accordance with its equitable powers, the Court should
change this jurisdictional practice.
The Court’s current approach to sovereign immunity—
that it is jurisdictional, rather than an affirmative defense—
exposes an inconsistency in the Court’s jurisprudence. In
theory, academics agree that Article III courts may only hear
a case against a federal defendant if the plaintiff has a cause
of action, the court has jurisdiction, and Congress has waived
sovereign immunity.
In practice, however, sovereign
immunity has not been treated as an independent
requirement; rather, sovereign immunity is treated as a
component of the jurisdictional requirement. As Professor
Vicki Jackson has argued, “What we call the ‘sovereign
immunity’ of the United States in many respects could be
described as a particularized elaboration of Congress’ control
over the lower court’s jurisdiction.” 181 As a result, courts
must raise the question of sovereign immunity even if the
parties fail to raise it. 182
This view of sovereign immunity waiver—that it is a
defining part of federal court jurisdiction and is only
congressionally controlled—does not make much sense. First,
it is not entirely clear in what sense sovereign immunity
waiver is “jurisdictional.” Jackson’s argument suggests that
it is a component of subject matter jurisdiction. 183 But, if this
is true, then 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which grants district courts
subject matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,”
would seem to have already granted district courts all the
original jurisdiction they need to hear claims against federal
defendants brought under the Constitution or federal laws.
Separate waivers of sovereign immunity would seem not to be

181. Jackson, supra note 81, at 521.
182. See SISK, supra note 11, §1.05.
183. Jackson, supra note 81, at 570–71.
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necessary, at least not as a jurisdictional matter.
Second, treating waivers as jurisdictional does not
comport with the federal judiciary’s expressed ability to shape
waiver in constitutional cases. In these cases, the courts
assert jurisdiction regardless of a lack of congressional
waiver. 184
Third—and perhaps most interestingly—treating federal
sovereign immunity waiver as strictly jurisdictional diverges
from state sovereign immunity practice. 185 State sovereign
immunity is often classified, in both state and federal
courts, 186 as an affirmative defense. 187 It is waivable by the
defendant, according to equitable principles, and it need not
be considered by the court sua sponte. 188 This state treatment
of sovereign immunity waiver allows cases to be resolved with
a greater degree of equity and deprives the government
defendant from unfair gamesmanship. For instance, in
184. See supra Part II.A.
185. For a thorough and thoughtful discussion of why state sovereign
immunity is best understood as being nonjurisdictional, see Scott Dodson,
Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (2008).
186. Caleb Nelson has offered an explanation for federal court treatment of
state sovereignty as an affirmative defense. It centers on the Article III “Case”
or “Controversy” requirement: “[M]any members of the Founding generation
thought that a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ did not exist unless both sides either
voluntarily appeared or could be hailed by the court. . . . Under background
rules of general law, a state could not be compelled to answer an individual’s
complaint. But if the state voluntarily appeared and submitted its dispute with
the plaintiff to the court, it created a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ and subjected itself
to the federal government’s judicial power.” Caleb Nelson, supra note 133, at
1565–66.
187. Federal circuit courts have themselves split on how they treat this issue.
See 13 RICHARD D. FREER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3524.1 (3d ed. 2013) (identifying the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits has courts that require “the immunity question, like one of
Article III jurisdiction, [to] be resolved before addressing the merits;” the First,
Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits as courts that have concluded
“they are not required to address [sovereign immunity] before proceeding to the
merits;” and the Second and Sixth Circuits have mixed law on the issue).
188. Notably, federal courts are allowed but not required to raise the issue of
state sovereign immunity sua sponte. See, e.g., id. (“The Court has sent
conflicting signals on the nature of the sovereign immunity defense. In some
ways, it has treated the defense as jurisdictional and in others it has not. It is
aware of this fact, and has forthrightly recognized that it has not definitively
resolved the question.”); Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496,
515 (1982) (“[B]ecause of the importance of state law in analyzing Eleventh
Amendment questions and because the State may, under certain circumstances,
waive this defense, we have never held that it is jurisdictional in the sense that
it must be raised and decided by this Court on its own motion.”).
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United States ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff, 189 upon appeal, the
State defendant asserted their sovereign immunity
conditionally. The State did not assert sovereign immunity
at the district court level, and it won on the merits. When the
plaintiff appealed, the State filed a brief requesting a review
of the merits, while noting that the State would only assert
its immunity if the court “reverse[d] the district court’s
merits-related decision.” Because state sovereign immunity
is an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional one, the
court had the power to decide whether the State had properly
raised the sovereign immunity defense, rather than needing
to resolve the sovereign immunity issue at the appeals
stage. 190
To resolve these conflicts and to bring federal waiver
practice into accord with a better understanding of each
branch’s constitutional role and powers, federal courts should
treat federal sovereign immunity waiver as an affirmative
defense. 191 At present, sovereign immunity waiver has been
promoted to a jurisdictional issue without reasons that
survive an analysis of sovereign immunity under the proxysovereign framework. 192 If Congress does not have exclusive
189. 548 F.3d 931 (10th Cir. 2008).
190. The court affirmed the district court on the merits, thereby preempting
the need to decide whether the State was properly defended by sovereign
immunity. Id. at 960.
191. Arguably, Congress could write sovereign immunity into its
jurisdictional constraints on the lower courts, but it has not. Although, I should
point out that it is possible that article III precludes even this stripping of
jurisdiction, since section 2 gives to the Supreme Court the authority to hear
“controversies to which the United States shall be a party” and then later either
gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction of these cases (as ones “affecting
. . . public ministers and consuls”) or appellate jurisdiction, which would imply
that some lower court would need jurisdiction to hear “controversies to which
the United States shall be a party” as a first matter. Admittedly this
interpretation of article III is itself controversial, but it has a plausible textual
basis upon which the Court could rely.
192. The Supreme Court and most federal circuit courts treat federal
sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional issue. See SISK, supra note 11, § 6.08
(Supp. 2012). But, as the Seventh Circuit illustrates, they need not. The
Seventh Circuit has adopted the position that sovereign immunity is not a
jurisdictional issue. See, e.g., United States v. County of Cook, Ill., 167 F.3d 381,
388–89 (7th Cir. 1999) (“For most purposes it overstates the strength of
sovereign immunity to analogize it to a lack of jurisdiction.”). Writing for the
circuit, Judge Easterbrook explained that sovereign immunity must not be
treated as jurisdictional because doing so would allow the United States to have
“as many bites at the apple as it finds necessary, until it has prevailed or
exhausted all available lines of argument,” since “every statute authorizing the
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control over waiver, then Congress’s silence on sovereign
immunity does not equate to a presumption of no waiver that
can be interpreted as part of its jurisdictional grants to lower
Article III courts. Instead, Congress’s silence on waiver
should trigger a look to the other federal branches, to see if
they have waived immunity. And, insofar as the Court holds
the equitable power to require parties to proceed when they
have not adequately raised their affirmative defenses, the
Court likewise holds the power to require a federal defendant
to proceed, when it has not raised to the Court its immunity
Such a waiver of sovereign immunity is
from suit. 193
consonant with the Court’s equitable case management
powers, which it wields on behalf of the sovereign people who,
without a constitutional court apparatus, would retain the
rights to operate courts in equity and exercise those courts’
inherent equitable authority. 194
Cases in which courts have found state sovereign
immunity defenses to have been waived are instructive.
These give clues as to what kinds of behaviors from a federal
defendant could prompt a court to exercise its equitable case
management powers to waive immunity for a federal
defendant that has not properly raised its immunity defense.
courts to adjudicate claims to property or funds of the United States is a waiver
of sovereign immunity, and every argument that the United States makes (or
omits) in defense is in the end an argument about sovereign immunity.” Id. at
385–86 (emphasis in original).
193. Cf. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133
(2008) (describing limitations on the Court’s power to exercise its equitable
authority in the face of particular kinds of congressional waiver). But at least
one scholar has noted that John R. Sand & Gravel Co. is an aberration from the
Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence. See Sisk, supra note 4, at 606,
(although the author believes the Court’s primary error in the case is in
interpreting a statute of limitations differently for the government than it
would for a private party).
194. Perhaps a clarification about “waiver” is needed here. We talk about
affirmative defenses being “waived” by defendants who do not raise them
sufficiently or in time. We likewise use the term “waive” to mean the
government’s withdrawal of its shield of sovereign immunity. Here, I am
arguing that where a federal defendant does not adequately raise its shield of
sovereign immunity—thereby, incurring unnecessary costs to the plaintiff and
the court and working hardship or inequity—that defendant may have “waived”
an affirmative defense. But sovereign immunity is not itself “waived” until the
Court finds that the defendant’s failure to raise the defense merits the use of
the Court’s equitable power to pierce the shield of immunity and “waive” (for
lack of a better word) immunity on behalf of the government party. See United
States v. County of Cook, Ill., 167 F.3d 381, 387 (7th Cir. 1999) (“It is the
judgment of the court, and not of the attorneys, that has legal effect.”).
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Delay is a common reason for waiver. 195 For instance, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina found that sovereign
immunity did not protect a defendant who waited to raise the
defense until appeal; in so doing, the Court even rejected the
contention that such a delay need result in “plain error” to
cause waiver. 196 Mere failure to plead was sufficient. 197
Likewise, Texas has established that where a governmental
defendant “waited until after the case was tried to a verdict
before asserting governmental immunity in a motion for
judgment n.o.v.,” the defendant was “not entitled to avoid
liability on the ground of governmental immunity.” 198 The
Texas Supreme Court reasoned that this waiver was required
by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which require that
parties plead affirmatively any avoidances or defenses so as
to “put openly in issue on the trial of a case all of the reasons,
in fact and in law, why the other party should not prevail.” 199
Other jurisdictions predicate their finding of an
immunity defense waiver on traditional prejudice
considerations. Recently, the Alaska Supreme Court held
that whether the state defendant had waived immunity
required an analysis of whether “the adverse party is
prejudiced by the moving party’s delay in raising the
defense.” 200 The Court noted that while the trial court had
properly considered the state’s ten-year delay in raising the
defense, the trial court had not properly decided whether that
delay itself prejudiced the plaintiff, or if the litigation had in
fact been extended by “bankruptcy proceedings and several
appeals.” 201 The Court remanded for trial court consideration
of all the factors relevant to any “prejudicial effect of the
State’s delay in raising the defense.” 202 Similarly, a New
Jersey court found that where a governmental defendant had
not specifically pled its immunity defense until more than two
195. See, e.g., Washington v. Whitaker, 451 S.E.2d 894, 898 (1994).
196. Washington v. Whitaker, 451 S.E.2d 894, 898 (1994).
197. Id.
198. Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Tex. 1988).
199. Id. (citation omitted); see also Gauvin v. City of New Haven, 445 A.2d 1,
3 (1982) (finding that sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense, requiring
affirmative pleading, in order “to apprise the court and the opposing party of the
issues to be tried and to prevent concealment of the issues until the trial is
underway”) (citing Pawlinski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 583, 586 (1973).
200. Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. State, 215 P.3d 333, 340 (Alaska 2009).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 341.
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years after the plaintiff filed her complaint, during which
time the defendant sought complete discovery and otherwise
fully participated in litigation, a sovereign immunity defense
had been waived. 203 The court found that allowing the
defense at this stage “would work injustice to another who,
having the right to do so, has detrimentally relied” on the
defendant’s implicit waiver. 204
These cases illustrate two relevant points: (1) the
treatment of sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense is
a practice well within the power and expertise of courts,
already accustomed to making case management
determinations of equity and justice; and (2) allowing
sovereign immunity to be a defense waivable by courts
according to equitable considerations does not mean the gate
to governmental liability will be thrown wide open. Federal
courts are, like state courts, capable of making these
equitable determinations, and state courts have shown
themselves restrained in granting these equitable waivers. 205
There is no reason to expect that federal courts will grant
waivers more broadly than states do, particularly in light of
congressional power to legislate the federal courts’ powers
away, if, for instance, courts grant equitable waivers too
loosely. It would be reasonable to expect that, in some cases,
federal courts will be confronted, as state courts have been,
with bad government defendant behavior. 206 Like state
courts, federal courts should be equipped to respond to case
misconduct within its role as proxy-sovereign case manager,
even if the offending party is the federal government. Courts
should assert their equitable case management powers to
treat federal sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense.
Nothing but a misunderstanding of sovereign powers
prevents them from doing so, and such a move would be in
line with the Court’s slow drift toward finding that
203. Hill v. Bd. of Educ. of Middletown Twp., 443 A.2d 225, 228 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1982).
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Chicago, 492 N.E.2d 1292, 1294–95 (Ill.
1986) (finding immunity defense under state tort law waivable but not waived
where pleaded—albeit imperfectly—in answer to complaint).
206. See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133
(2008) (at the trial level, federal government conceded the timeliness of certain
plaintiff claims and then won on the merits; amicus brief raised the issue on
appeal and the Court found claims barred by untimeliness).
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“procedural rules . . . are to be applied in the same manner
[against federal government defendants] as among private
parties, with no special solicitude for the government.” 207
D. The Executive and the Waiver Power
As Congress and the Court are partial proxy sovereigns,
the Executive too serves as a partial proxy sovereign for the
American people because, according to the Constitution, it
wields one part of the people’s sovereign powers (i.e., the
Executive power). The Executive’s proxy sovereignty is
created by and detailed in Article II, which vests in the
President “[t]he executive power” and specifies the
By identifying the
President’s constitutional roles. 208
President as a partial proxy sovereign, Article II grants the
President (and the agencies he directs) a part of the sovereign
waiver authority currently being exercised by Congress and
the Court. But also like Congress and the Court, the
President is constrained by his proxy sovereignty to exercise
the sovereign waiver power in accord with his constitutional
roles and powers. 209
1. The Executive’s Constitutional Role
Article II is misty at best about what exactly the
“executive power” entails. 210 Some have argued that the
specific roles and tasks prescribed by Article II are the sum
total of the President’s “executive power.” 211 Others have
207. Sisk, supra note 4, at 522.
208. U.S. CONST. art. II.
209. Id.
210. See also KRENT, supra note 149, at I (“Understanding presidential
powers from a constitutional perspective is . . . difficult. There is no readily
definable list of attributes or authorities. Article II itself is quite vague, never
defining the ‘executive’ power with specificity.”).
211. See, e.g., id. at 12 (quoting PACIFICUS NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton); id. at
I (“The discrete powers granted to the president, such as the authority to enter
into treaties, serve as commander in chief, and appoint superior officers, do not
define the precise contours of what presidents can or should do. . . . [M]ost are of
the view that the constitutional language presents only a starting point that
must be complemented by considerations of the overall structure of the
Constitution, the underlying purposes of those who drafted Article II and
ratified the Constitution, and historical practice.”); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra
note 139, at 1177–78 (“[T]he status of the Vesting Clause of Article II as a
substantive grant of power is hotly debated. . . . The non-unitarians read [the
Article II Vesting Clause] as substantively meaningless because of the specific
enumeration of presidential powers in Article II, Section 2.”).
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argued that the “executive power” comprises more than the
Article II articulations, with the outer limits of the executive
power undefined by the Constitution itself. 212 Resolving the
merits of these arguments is beyond the scope of this Article.
It is sufficient to accept the following about the President’s
constitutional roles: (1) he has a constitutional obligation to
“preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States” 213; (2) he has a constitutional responsibility and the
authority to “take care that the laws be faithfully
executed” 214; (3) he leads subordinate organelles within the
executive branch215; and (4) he is elected in a way more
responsive to popular will than to congressional control.216
Whether these responsibilities and powers are within the
“executive power” or outside of it, it is clear that these are
within the President’s constitutional domain and they are
only so because he was chosen by the sovereign people to
exercise these sovereign powers in their stead.
212. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 139, at 1177–78 (“The
unitarians construe it as an affirmative grant of power to supervise and control
all subordinate officials ‘executing’ existing constitutional and statutory
provisions.”).
213. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1.
214. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3.
215. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2 (“[The President] may require the opinion, in
writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments. . . . [H]e
shall nominate . . . [and] appoint . . . all other officers of the United States,
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by law.”); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American
Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256,
1270–71, 1275 (2006) (“Hence, the mere fact that the heads of departments
would be appointed by the President, that Congress itself had no appointing
power for administrative officials under the Constitution, and that ‘heads of
Departments’ in the Appointments Clause seemed to presume single-headed
administrative entities, would suggest to any proponent of the new
Constitution’s executive arrangements a colossal improvement over the years of
the Confederacy. There would indeed be a unitary ‘executive’ but what that
meant for the organization of ‘administration’ remained to be determined.”). Cf.
KRENT, supra note 149, at 20–23 (exploring the argument that “[a] strong
conception of a unitary executive . . . runs afoul of historical precedent and
Congress’s discretion under Article I to provide for what it determines is the
best mechanism, consistent with other constitutional restraints, of
implementing congressional directives,” in particular, Congress’s authority to
delegate specific executive responsibilities to particular agency officials, rather
than the to the President).
216. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XII; Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E.
Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385, 1391 (2008) (“One of
the obvious defining features of the US Presidency is the national electoral
constituency.”).
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In
practice,
these
presidential
responsibilities,
authorities, and roles are relevant to federal sovereign
immunity practice in the following ways. Congress has
created executive departments, which are under the
President’s control. 217 Each department 218 is governed by an
organic statute, which is Congress’s charge to the agency.
The President and his executive officers are required to lead
the agencies in accord with the Constitution and with the
congressional laws they were created to execute. Thus, via
these agencies, the President fulfills his constitutional
responsibility to “take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. . . .” 219
Importantly, an agency and its officials cannot lawfully
act outside of Congress’s statutory charge to them. 220 To do so
would be to act ultra vires; these actions consistently get
struck down by the Court for being impermissible. 221 Also
significantly, an agency and its officials cannot lawfully act
contrary to statute. 222 Again, doing so would be ultra vires
217. This is arguably true, even for independent executive agencies, over
which the President does not have direct appointment or removal powers. See
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 583 (1984) (“All agencies,
whether denominated executive or independent, have relationships with the
President in which he is neither dominant nor powerless. They are all subject to
presidential direction in significant aspects of their functioning, and able to
resist presidential direction in others (generally concerning substantive
decisions).”); KRENT, supra note 149, at 49 (“Although presidents can shape the
exercise of power by heads of ‘executive’ agencies far more than ‘independent’
agencies, they can attempt to influence the exercise of delegated authority by all
agency heads.”).
218. With the possible exception of the military, which was constitutionally
ordained. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
219. U.S. CONST., art. II,§ 3.
220. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38
(1952) (Jackson, J. concurring) (explaining that the President’s power flows and
ebbs with congressional authorization and disapproval, respectively).
221. See, e.g., Akram v. Holder, 721 F.3d 853, 864 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding
that the immigration regulation in question is ultra vires insofar as it requires
that certain immigration petitioners adjust status only by way of a relationship
to the petitioning citizen, a requirement not supported by statute); EME Homer
City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Absent a claim of
constitutional authority (and there is none here), executive agencies may
exercise only the authority conferred by statute, and agencies may not
transgress statutory limits on that authority. Here, EPA’s Transport Rule
exceeds the agency’s statutory authority in two independent respects.”).
222. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2012) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . .
in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory

BRINTON FINAL

2014]

5/23/201412:39 PM

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

289

and, moreover, would be a forsaking of the executive
responsibility to faithfully execute the laws. But, within
congressional and constitutional bounds, agencies are often
able to act with wide latitude and discretion. Organic
statutes are notoriously vague, appearing to give agencies
broad authority to create regulations and take action, even
though technically confined within a particular congressional
purview. 223 In practice, agencies act as quasi-policymaking
bodies, which can regulate broadly with little review. 224
Despite some private efforts to have this policymaking
declared unconstitutional, the Court has long upheld the
executive’s authority to regulate in accordance with
In
congressionally issued “intelligible principle[s].” 225
addition to rulemaking, which is a major part of executive
efforts to faithfully execute the laws, agencies act via
investigations, licensing, sanctions, adjudications, grants, and
other orders. They justify these actions as being necessary
for fulfillment of their congressional and constitutional

right.”). See, e.g., City of Arlington, Tex. v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 133 S. Ct.
1863 (2013) (“[F]or agencies charged with administering congressional
statutes,”“[b]oth their power to act and how they are to act is authoritatively
prescribed by Congress, so that when they act improperly, no less than when
they act beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is ultra vires.”).
223. E.g., Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 151 (2006)) (“For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign
commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States, without discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate
facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the national defense, for the
purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and
radio communications, and for the purpose of securing a more effective
execution of this policy by centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to
several agencies and by granting additional authority with respect to interstate
and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication, there is created a
commission to be known as the ‘Federal Communications Commission’, which
shall be constituted as hereinafter provided, and which shall execute and
enforce the provisions of this chapter.”). Vague statutes such as these give rise
to scholars’ concerns about the nondelegation doctrine, which some believe to be
the constitutional requirement that Congress—and not agencies—make the
laws that bind citizens.
224. Agency regulations are generally open to public challenge in the courts
via the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012). But
insofar as legal challenges are merely efforts to second-guess agency
policymaking, rather than to allege procedural violations or truly ultra vires
actions, they are largely unsuccessful.
225. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
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obligations. 226
2.

The Executive’s Waiver Power

The President’s proxy-sovereign power to execute the
laws created by Congress shapes his proxy-sovereign power to
waive immunity. Once Congress has created a law and
delegated it to an agency for execution, that agency can use
all its powers (congressionally crafted or constitutionally
inherent in the executive) to fulfill its faithful execution
obligations. 227 As Professor Henry Monaghan has explained,
“[U]nlike the legislature, administrative agencies can never
pretend to an unlimited power to select among goals; the
universe of each agency is limited by the legislative
specifications contained in its organic act.” 228
Although Congress may prescribe the laws that the
executive must execute, it is the Constitution that imposes
upon the executive the obligation to faithfully execute the
law. Accordingly, if an agency determines that to faithfully
execute the law sovereign immunity should be waived, then,
as part of the executive, it can exercise the President’s proxysovereign authority to do so. 229 It must, however, act within
the following constraint: an executive agency cannot waive
immunity where Congress has expressly retained federal
sovereign immunity. This constraint is a constitutional one.
For the executive to waive immunity in contradiction to a
congressional directive would be a violation of the executive’s
obligation to faithfully execute the law. 230 Therefore, if
226. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2011).
227. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1983).
228. Id.
229. Or the President himself could direct the agencies via executive order to
adopt regulations waiving sovereign immunity where Congress has not
otherwise done so. See KRENT, supra note 149, at 57 (“[P]residents enjoy the
discretion under Article II—at least in the absence of congressional indication to
the contrary—to mold the rulemaking of executive agencies as long as agency
heads retain the formal right to issue the final rule.”).
230. I acknowledge that this point is arguable. The Constitution may
identify some areas of control in which the President can act, regardless of
contradictory congressional mandate: e.g., direction of the military, some
aspects of foreign relations, appointment of officers, etc. But I’d argue that his
actions in these areas would not be in furtherance of his constitutional
obligation to faithfully execute the law but in furtherance of his other
constitutional obligations, so he is not bound to congressional will in the same
way. And too, if we take a Justice Jackson Youngstownian approach, the
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Congress has enacted statutes that explicitly raise the shield
of immunity, then the executive cannot act to lower that
shield. For example, because the Flood Control Act of 1928
expressly dictates that “[n]o liability of any kind shall attach
to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by
floods or flood waters at any place,” 231 the executive could not
act to waive sovereign immunity in the Katrina litigation,232
even if the President or his administrators had wanted to. 233
Understanding that the executive can waive immunity as
part of its larger efforts to faithfully execute the law
illuminates the forms that executive waiver can take. Like
other executive efforts to implement statute, agencies can
waive immunity to execute statutes through (1) rulemaking
and (2) other agency action. This means that an agency can
promulgate a regulation through its regular means—subject
to the procedural constraints of the Administrative Procedure
Act or other legal direction—that waives immunity. 234 This
would allow agencies to do more than adopt regulations
waiving immunity for suits. Insofar as executive agencies
currently claim that congressional failure to waive sovereign
immunity limits them from adopting regulations that would
allow settlement of cases, payment of interest and back pay,
etc. (see discussion above), they would no longer be so limited.
Rather, they could adopt these regulations if they, by
exercising their proxy-sovereign authority to waive sovereign
President may not be without power to act in contradiction to congressional
approval; his authority may just be at its lowest ebb. See Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952).
231. Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. § 702c (“No liability of any kind
shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods
or flood waters at any place . . . .”).
232. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation (Katrina Levees), 533 F. Supp.
2d 615, 643 (E.D. La. 2008) (finding that sovereign immunity prevented suit
against the federal government for injuries related to the levee failures during
Hurricane Katrina).
233. President Obama may have considered waiving immunity in the
Katrina litigation had the option been open to him. At an October 2009 meeting
with New Orleans residents to discuss the government’s participation in the
Katrina clean-up, President Obama is reported to have said, “[W]e are working
as hard as we can, as quickly as we can,” and then added, “I wish I could just
write a check.” To which someone called out, “Why not?” President Obama
responded, “There’s this whole thing about the Constitution.” Peter Baker &
Campbell Robertson, Obama Meets Critics in New Orleans, NY TIMES (Oct. 15,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/16/us/politics/16obama.html.
234. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq (2012).
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immunity, deem such regulations would allow them to
faithfully execute the law.
In addition to acting by regulation, it seems likely that
executive agencies could act to waive immunity on a case-bycase basis. Their authority to do this stems from one of two
sources: (1) judicial authority to waive immunity for equitable
purposes, or (2) the agency’s own authority to act instantially.
The first source of the authority is really the flip-side of the
court’s authority to waive immunity for case management
purposes. If an agency or federal official is sued and chooses
to respond without raising the defense of sovereign immunity,
then, as discussed above, the Court could choose to require
the federal defendant to participate in the suit, even without
another applicable legislative, regulatory, or judicial waiver.
This of course puts the ultimate decision about waiver in the
hands of the Court, but at least it suggests one way in which
an agency could choose to act to increase the likelihood of its
being subject to suit.
The second source of an agency’s authority to waive
immunity on an ad hoc basis is its administrative power to
decide between acting by rulemaking or by adjudication. 235
Current administrative law principles hold that agencies
have largely unreviewable authority to decide whether to act
by promulgating regulations—that is, by issuing broad-based,
law-type rules that bind those to whom they apply—or by
acting ad hoc—i.e., issuing orders, imposing sanctions,
deciding individual cases, etc. 236 Agency authority to act in
this ad hoc way is not clean or uncontroversial, but it is fairly
well established. 237 Courts are very unlikely to reprimand an
agency that has acted without having first established a
regulation that would inform the public as to the direction of
235. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he
choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc
litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the
administrative agency.”).
236. Id. at 202 (“Not every principle essential to the effective administration
of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule.
Some principles must await their own development, while others must be
adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its
important functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency must
be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order.”).
237. LAWSON, supra note 11, at 364–68 (noting that the Chenery II holding
“remains a bedrock principle of federal administrative law—though . . . it
displays a few fault lines”).
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and purpose behind that agency action. 238 If an agency
wanted to respond to suit in a given case, it could likely do so,
even without a regulation expressly waiving immunity. The
court would likely allow the case to proceed, unless doing so
would violate a contrary regulation or statute. 239
Understanding that the executive can act to waive
immunity means that the President and his agencies are no
longer prevented by congressional silence from authorizing
suits against federal agencies or federal officials. 240 Some
may wonder why an agency would want to authorize suits
against it or its officials. For good reasons, agencies may
choose to not exercise their waiver powers in most
circumstances. But politics itself may present the executive
with occasions in which it wants to open itself to potential
liability and court review. 241 A presidential administration
may want to allow suit for actions taken or regulations
instituted by a previous administration. Or it may want to
compensate the injured for political good will: to be seen as
fair, benevolent, or publicly responsive. Less cynically, a
sense of justice itself might prompt an agency to waive
immunity for its own actions, as might a realization (either
internally or special-interest-group driven) that allowing
citizen suits could be a real mechanism for checking agency
behavior, during the current administration or in the future.

238. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202–03 (“[P]roblems may arise in a case which
the administrative agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must
be solved despite the absence of a relevant general rule. . . . In those situations,
the agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a case-by-case basis
if the administrative process is to be effective.”).
239. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).
240. Notably, at this time, any judgment rendered against an administrative
agency would be recoverable. As discussed below, because of the Judgment
Fund, see infra note 246, any damage judgments issued against an
administrative agency would be payable without further congressional
authorization. Of course, in cases for declaratory or injunctive relief, the
executive does not need congressional authorization to comply with court
judgments against it.
241. Others have recognized that politics might motivate agency
participation in granting monetary settlements against an agency, as
authorized in some cases by the Judgment Fund. See Peterson, supra note 146,
at 331 (“[W]hen the Department defends cases brought against the federal
government, it may wish to compensate plaintiffs for political reasons or
because the administration favors the plaintiff’s cause, even though the
plaintiff’s legal claim is weak.”).
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E. The Problem of the Purse
There is one important caveat: money. As discussed
above, Congress has plenary authority over federal money.242
Therefore, absent legislation authorizing the payment of
money damages in suits against the government, the Court
has no way to make Congress pay damages. This is true, even
in cases for governmental wrongs. This concern is less
important than it seems at first glance. As a first matter, the
issue of payment is one that regularly plagues plaintiffs
seeking damages.
In most civil suits, when plaintiffs
awarded damages, they must then proceed to try to collect.
Courts do not usually withhold judgment or otherwise
prevent suit, merely because they foresee that plaintiffs are
unlikely to get payment.
They allow suit to proceed
regardless, issue a judgment, and, if the plaintiffs are
successful, allow the plaintiffs to seek payment according to
law. While some have argued that federal defendants are
different, I would argue that they are not.
First of all, the Court can limit its court-created
constitutional waivers to cases in which plaintiffs sue
individual federal officials; in these cases, seeking payment of
money judgments would proceed as they would in typical civil
cases. 243 But second, should the Court decide to create a
constitutional cause of action for money damages against the
United States itself (or one of its organelles, rather than one
of its officers), a successful plaintiff is not categorically barred
from receiving payment. Like plaintiffs in typical civil suits,
a victorious plaintiff in such a case has a legal method to seek
payment—merely the method differs.
With a money
judgment in hand, he or she can petition Congress to
authorize the payment of that judgment via a special bill or
some relevant general legislation. This may not be easy,
sure—but money collection rarely is. And Congress may
sometimes be willing to pay. 244 The possibility that a
242. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; see Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 93.
243. Notably, executive agencies often indemnify individual officials in these
suits. Whether they do this is a policy decision, up to the particular agency;
whether they have money to pay for it is similarly a question for the agency and
its congressional authorization. The Court need not be concerned with the
existence of these arrangements, but it might validly consider them as part of
its weighing of the benefits or costs of creating a constitutional legal remedy
against individual federal officials.
244. Consider Congress’s efforts to retroactively take responsibility for the
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defendant may not make good on a judgment should not
prevent a plaintiff from obtaining that judgment. 245
As a second matter, Congress has already statutorily
authorized the payment of money damages against federal
government defendants. 246 Not since the middle of the
twentieth century has Congress been required to appropriate
funds for every individual claim made payable against the
government. 247 In 1956, Congress enacted the Judgment
Fund Act, creating a fund allowing for the payment from the
Treasury for most damage awards issued against the federal
government. 248 The fund was created without monetary limit
and without the need for recurring appropriations. 249 Soon,
Congress amended the act to allow for payment out of the
Judgment Fund for settlements in “actual or imminent”
litigation. 250 And in 1977, Congress eliminated the previous
cap of $100,000 payment per judgment. 251 The Judgment
Fund still exists today, as an essentially limitless, preauthorized appropriation for the payment of money damages
awarded in federal court or otherwise authorized by the
Department of Justice for settlement. 252 The Judgment Fund,
military plane crash into the Empire State Building. See supra Part I.B
(discussion of the passage of the FTCA). Congress created a law—a broad,
liability-inviting, tort reform law—in response to public sentiment that the
government should pay for some of its tortious actions. It is possible to imagine
Congress again being willing to curry public favor by fulfilling a court-imposed
obligation to pay damages for an executive action the judiciary has found faulty.
Authorizing a payment on a politically popular court judgment may make
Congress look like the hero.
245. Addressing the question of unenforceability in a similar context
(whether unenforceability renders a judgment against the United States an
advisory opinion and therefore impermissible), Judge Easterbrook wrote in
United States v. County of Cook, Ill., “Although the raw power of Congress to
withhold appropriations means that a given judgment requiring the United
States to pay money may be unenforceable, this remote possibility does not
render all judgments advisory.” 167 F.3d 381, 386 (7th Cir. 1999).
246. 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012).
247. See Act of July 27, 1956, ch. 13, 70 Stat. 694 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §
1304); Peterson, supra note 146, at 349; Lowell E. Baier, Reforming the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 38 J. LEGIS. 1, 9 (2012).
248. 31 U.S.C. § 1304.
249. Id.
250. Act of Aug. 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-187, 75 Stat. 415–16 (1961) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (2006)); Peterson, supra note 146, at 349; Baier,
supra note 247, at 9.
251. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-26, § 101, 91
Stat. 61, 96; Peterson, supra note 146, at 349.
252. 31 U.S.C. § 1304; see 31 C.F.R. § 256.1 (2012) (“The Judgment Fund is a
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therefore, represents Congress’s acquiescence to payment of
money damages from the Treasury in cases against the
federal government. Congress could, of course, repeal the
Judgment Fund Act, but so far, it has shown no interest in
doing so. Until then, however, the Court should not worry
about ordering the government to pay money damages in
cases. 253 Legally, the awards can be honored, via the
processes established by the Financial Management Service,
the arm of the U.S. Treasury tasked with administering the
legislatively created Judgment Fund. 254
CONCLUSION
Sovereign immunity as a defense against government
liability is notoriously unpopular. It is one of the rare legal
doctrines that draw outrage (rather than mere ambivalence
or apathy) from the public. As the recent Hurricane Katrina
litigation reminded us, when members of the public are
denied redress for governmental grievances on the sole basis
permanent, indefinite appropriation which is available to pay many judicially
and administratively ordered monetary awards against the United States. In
addition, amounts owed under compromise agreements negotiated by the U.S.
Department of Justice in settlement of claims arising under actual or imminent
litigation are normally paid from the Judgment Fund, if a judgment on the
merits would be payable from the Judgment Fund.”). See also The Judgment
Fund: Common Questions, FIN. MGMT. SERV., https://www.fms.treas.gov/
judgefund/questions.html. The mass appropriation of Judgment Fund money is
consistent with Congress’s practice of “granting lump sum appropriations” due
to Congress’s inability to “foresee every particular expenditure necessary.”
KRENT, supra note 149, at 78.
253. Some might argue that a resort to petitioning of the legislative process
would transform the court’s judgment into an advisory opinion. I see the
reasoning behind such an argument—without legal authority to formally fix
repayment, the Court is merely issuing position statements on situations it
cannot meaningfully redress—but I think it oversimplifies the difficult
questions raised by redressability, and it misapprehends the current legal
landscape. As discussed above, Congress has already authorized payment of
most money damages against the government and a simplified, streamlined
process for requesting payment exists. See 31 C.F.R. § 256. For the time being,
this should largely settle the matter. But second, individuals will always be
able to petition for private relief; Congress might well be more inclined to honor
the payment demands of individuals who have won a judgment in a court, after
the vetting inherent in a formalized fact-finding, claim resolution process. While
this may be a less direct form of redress, it is not necessarily the kind of
unredressability that should preclude Article III courts from hearing these
claims as “cases” or “controversies.”
254. See id. The Judgment Fund: Common Questions, FIN. MGMT. SERV.,
https://www.fms.treas.gov/judgefund/.
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of federal sovereign immunity, the public response is not
positive. Scholars, too, criticize the doctrine, arguing for its
demise on the grounds that it is undemocratic, illogical, and
unfair. Perhaps this widespread negative sentiment could be
ameliorated if people felt the doctrine (a) allowed more access
to government liability, and (b) operated in a way that more
clearly and rationally served the interests of the true
sovereign, rather than the interests of self-interested, lazy, or
ineffectual congressmen.
A two-dimensional version of the waiver power, in which
Congress and the Court share authority to waive immunity,
is constitutionally mandatory. It is time for the Court to
recognize the critical role it does and should play in checking
the constitutional behavior of the other branches. But a
three-dimensional form of the waiver power is also
constitutionally possible.
Either of these multi-dimensional understandings of the
waiver power would not necessitate an expansion of waiver,
but they certainly make it more possible. And individuals
seeking redress or a chance for redress for government
grievances would have more opportunities to persuade federal
authorities to waive immunity in the ways they can. At
present, the only way to meaningfully seek waiver where
there is none is to lobby Congress to adopt legislation to that
end—an expensive and herculean task, one not well suited to
the needs of the small populations likely to be hurt by any
particular act of government wrongdoing. But acknowledging
that each branch has its own access to waiver, subject to its
constitutionally imposed sovereign limitations, would allow
the injured the opportunity to petition Congress, agencies,
and courts to consider lowering the shield of sovereignty in
the ways the branches can. The aggrieved may not receive
the redress or opportunity for suit they desire, but at least
they have multiple points of more localized entry to rally for
the waiver they seek.
This expanded potential for federal liability might raise
concerns for those focused on limiting government
expenditures. Let Congress keep control over the waiver
power, they say, lest the will of the few overwhelm the
resources of the many. But those concerned that Congress is
uniquely suited to make decisions regarding competing
political interests cannot deny that Congress shares that
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institutional competency, at least in part, with the agencies to
whom it currently delegates a lot of policymaking. In
countless ways, it already recognizes that policymaking is a
domain it can share with another branch. Further, to those
who would entrust waiver decisions exclusively to
congressional expertise, I say that sovereign immunity waiver
is not purely a policy issue. It is fundamentally rooted in
notions of supreme control, nationhood, and governmental
soundness.
While federal immunity waiver has policy
implications, it also has deep legitimacy consequences. 255 The
federal government’s ability to take any action—to exist,
even—is a luxury provided it by the founding people. And
whether it uses that derivative authority to serve the people
in ways that are not just prudent, but are constitutional and
proper, will render the federal government faithful to its
sovereign or will show it to be a bad proxy.
Yes, keeping the federal government in line with its
charging orders is a task Congress should, as a policy matter,
share with its fellow branches. But policy considerations
aside, the Constitution makes clear: sovereign immunity and
sovereign immunity waiver are concerns Congress already
shares with the executive and the judiciary—the other
branches the true sovereign chose to wield its proxy federal
sovereignty. Federal agencies and courts need now only wake
up, act, and, as necessary, save the people from the unitary
tyranny of a sovereign Congress.

255. Odette Lienau describes the “school of popular sovereignty” as
acknowledging that “the ultimate power and autonomy associated with
sovereignty does not lie in the mere fact of governmental control” but “with a
‘sovereign people,’ whose consent provides legitimacy to the government and
authority for its decision.” Lienau, supra note 132, at 76–77.

